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PREFACE
The six-hundred year old Ottoman Empire came to an end after a defeat in the 
Great War. A new Turkish nationalist movement emerged against the Allied 
occupation in Asia Minor, largely made up of the Greek army, in 1919. Against the 
Greek occupying forces, the Turks won their War of Independence and 
established the Turkish Republic in 1923. This thesis examines U.S. foreign 
relations with the new Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1927. As an 
introduction, the first chapter will explain the relationship between the United 
States and the Ottoman Empire through the end of the Great War. The second 
chapter will focus on the 1922-23 treaty negotiations at Lausanne among Turkey, 
the U.S., and the Allied Powers, mainly Britain, France and Italy. The last chapter 
will study the American peoples’ reaction to the Lausanne Treaty until early 1927.
This thesis primarily depends on U.S. historical resources. Without distinction, 
most of these resources define the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the 
Republic of Turkey, as Turkey. In order to emphasize the difference, the thesis 
refers to these countries as the Ottoman Empire until its end in 1923, unless in 
direct quotation, and Turkey after 1923. The place names that were unanimously 
spelled the same are not translated into their modern Turkish names -  the modern 
names did not become official until the Turkish adoption of the Latin alphabet in 
1929.1 For instance, Smyrna, Constantinople and Angora are not translated into
1 This style is borrowed from Leland James Gordon’s American Relations with Turkey, 1830- 
1930: An Economic Interpretation. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).
iv
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Izmir, Istanbul or Ankara. Since the lesser known place names were spelled 
differently from one resource to another, I chose to use their modern names. In 
order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the Lausanne Treaty is sometimes referred 
to as the Treaty, and the Department of State as the Department. Asia Minor and 
Anatolia are used interchangeably to define the current Turkish land mass on the 
Asian side of the country. The Near East in this work entails the entire Middle East 
regardless whether certain lands in the Middle East were under Ottoman control 
during the time of this study.
The third chapter largely explains how the Turks’ massacre and dislocation of 
Armenians during and after the Great War affected American public opinion, and 
as a result how the public wanted to influence U.S. foreign policy to help the 
Armenians. The goal is to explore how the Armenian Genocide informed the 
American people’s foreign policy choices. It is beyond the focus of this thesis to 
narrate the Armenian Genocide or verify the accuracy of American people’s 
knowledge about what actually happened. The thesis operates within common 
American perceptions of Turks and the events that took place.
v
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ABSTRACT




University of New Hampshire, September, 2007
The U.S. and Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and established 
equal relations. In 1927, the U.S. Senate rejected this treaty. The Coolidge 
administration, however, ignored the Senate’s rejection and activated the Treaty 
shortly thereafter. This study was conducted to determine why the Lausanne 
Treaty was rejected and how it survived. Under investigation were: the origins of 
the U.S. foreign policy in the Near East, the Lausanne Conference negotiations, 
and the American public’s reaction to the Lausanne Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty 
was a result of a persistent U.S. Open Door foreign policy that was supported by 
the new Turkish government. But an important segment of the American public 
strenuously objected to this policy. Furthermore, the Turks’ massacre of its 
Armenians minority population in large scales in 1914 and 1915 galvanized the 
American public against the Turks. Despite these factors, the Lausanne Treaty 
survived because the anti-Lausanne Treaty movement lost momentum due to 
some people’s rejection of the prejudiced propaganda and a weary U.S. public 
turning its attention elsewhere.
VII
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INTRODUCTION
After a long train journey from Angora to Constantinople on March 5,1927, 
Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, American High Commissioner to Turkey, took 
the ferry from Haydar Pasha Station to Perha with Mrs. Bristol. The cool 
Mediterranean wind felt nicer than the cold and dusty Angora air during their short 
but magical journey from the Asian to the European side of the city. Numerous 
joyful embassy staff and the American residents of Constantinople greeted the 
Bristols.1 The American Diaspora at Constantinople believed that the Turkish 
treaty in Bristol’s briefcase, originally signed in 1923 at Lausanne, Switzerland but 
never ratified by the Senate, would protect their schools, businesses and relief 
efforts in the Near East. Although the 1923 Lausanne Treaty had been rejected by 
the Senate only a month before, by sending Bristol to Angora right after the 
Senate’s rejection, the Calvin Coolidge Administration officially recognized the new 
Turkish Republic and agreed to have a relationship based on equality and 
international law. This study explores the factors that contributed to the Senate’s 
rejection of the Lausanne Treaty in January 1927. Furthermore, it explains how the 
rejected Lausanne Treaty survived and was activated despite the Senate’s non­
ratification.
This work will operate on four levels, each of which is influenced by four 
historians and their theories. Although these historians, Walter LaFeber, Matthew
1 Mark Lambert Bristol, (Unpublished Diary), March 5, 1927, Box 8, File: February and March 
1927, Mark Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington).
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Connelly, Michael Hunt and Kristin Hoganson, did not specifically write about 
Turkish-American relations during the 1920’s, they influenced this work with their 
approach to the origins of U.S. foreign policy. The first level argues that the U.S. 
applied an Open Door policy between 1909 and 1927 in the Near East.
The U.S. Open Door policy emerged from the idea of preventing European 
powers from creating spheres of influence in China so that the U.S. businesses 
could invest freely in the region. When the U.S. decided to expand its influence 
over the Pacific Ocean at the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers 
had already parceled out China. Rejecting the European nations’ creation of 
spheres of influence in China, John Milton Hay (1838-1905), Secretary of State, 
sent notes to Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and France in 1899.1 Unlike 
the traditional imperial tendencies of the old world powers, which was divide and 
rule, the U.S. advocated maintaining the political entity of China while allowing all 
powers to invest in the country freely. The U.S. began to apply the same policy to 
the Near East during the William Taft administration. The Secretary of State at the 
time, Philander C. Knox, was a strong advocate of the Open Door policy.
In his groundbreaking book, The New Empire, Walter LaFeber emphasized 
that from the beginning the U.S. deliberately sought to establish an economic 
empire.2 LaFeber challenged previously widespread theories that claimed U.S. 
policy makers for a short period of time at the turn of the twentieth century fancied
1 Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy {New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1963), 363.
2 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (New  
York: Cornell University Press, 1963).
2
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creating an imperial power. According to these earlier theories, the imperial frenzy 
ended during the early 1920’s.3 LaFeber, however, showed us that from the early 
days of its establishment, the U.S. was destined to be an economic empire and 
that was why according to him, the declaration of the U.S. as an imperial power in 
mid nineteenth century was a logical historical development.4 The new-left 
historians had already declared that the U.S. was established as an empire.5 
Building his theory on this premise, LaFeber revolutionized the “empire” theory: 
American industrialization during the nineteenth century and the maturation of the 
empire went hand in hand.6 By the end of the nineteenth century, LaFeber 
maintains that American capitalists and foreign policy makers came to a 
conclusion that a U.S. economic empire “would be the balm for international and 
domestic ills.”7 This thesis validates LaFeber’s theory in the sense that foreign 
policy makers and businessmen helped each other to create a post-Great War 
U.S. foreign policy for the Near East. Under this policy, the U.S. needed to apply 
an Open Door framework in the region in order to maintain its economic growth by 
exploiting the oil reserves of the Near East, as well as world peace.
3 For example, in his book, America’s Colonial Experience: How the United States gained, 
governed, and in part gave away a colonial empire (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1951), historian 
Julius W. Pratt claimed that the withdrawal from imperial power mentality began when Warren 
Harding became president in 1921, 313.
4 LaFeber, 60.
5 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, second edition (New York: 
Delta, 1962), 19. Richard W . Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (New York: W . W . Norton
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Second, during the Lausanne Conference, the Turks welcomed the U.S. Open 
Door policy, and furthermore, they encouraged it. Turkey’s priority was to emerge 
as a sovereign nation from the Lausanne negotiations. Their primary diplomatic 
tool during the negotiations was to pit the U.S. Open Door policy against British 
imperialism. Matthew Connelly studied the impact of the Algerian War of 
Independence on great power politics. According to Connelly, the Algerian 
Revolution was “distinctively diplomatic in nature, and most decisive struggles 
occurred in the international arena.”8 He demonstrated that Algerian nationalists 
exploited differences between super powers and played off them in order to 
achieve independence.9 Algerian nationalists were aware of Cold War diplomacy 
and created their own space within it to realize their independence. During the time 
frame of Connelly’s book, mostly 1950’s and 1960’s, Algeria took advantage of the 
Cold War ideological struggle. This work applies this small power strategy to the 
Turkish War of Independence. During the 1920’s, great powers were struggling for 
spheres of influence and natural resources. Turkish nationalists used this struggle 
to their advantage by playing the U.S. against Britain.
Third, the public’s rejection of the Treaty provided policy makers with the 
ideological foundation to shape their policy towards Turkey, usually in the form of 
protecting American honor and racial and religious prejudice. The coalition against 
normalized relations with Turkey and the Open Door policy, however, was not 
sustained after the Treaty was rejected because a pragmatist approach gained
8 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of 
the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.
9 Ibid, 277.
4
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ground among citizens, policy makers, and even those people who previously 
opposed any type of relations with Turkey. This premise applies Michael Hunt’s 
“ideology” in order to explain the relationship between public rhetoric against 
Turkey and the Turks and the rejection of Lausanne Treaty.
Michael Hunt introduced ideology as the central component in foreign 
policymaking.10 According to Hunt, ideology helps the policy makers and the public 
to constitute a framework in which policy makers can “reduce complicated 
problems to manageable proportions...to marshal support at home for the choices 
they had made.”11 Thus, Hunt suggests ideology as a two-lane road: on one side, 
policy makers explain complicated matters to the public by using simple and 
ideologically loaded terms -  national greatness, racial hierarchy and anti­
revolutionary attitude. On the other side, by constantly making ideological choices, 
people affect the policy makers’ decision making process. The “ideology” theory 
helps us better understand the relationship between the anti-Turkish and anti- 
Muslim attitude in public and the policy makers’ strategic approach towards U.S.- 
Turkish relations.
Fourth, the opponents of ratifying the Lausanne Treaty advocated for 
relinquishing the Open Door policy and the (re)establishment of a foreign policy 
based on ethics and morality. The individuals, religious organizations, and interest 
groups who demanded this shift mobilized against the U.S. policy in the Near East, 
particularly against the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that they believed was a
10 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 3.
11 Ibid, 16.
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
manifestation of the Open Door policy. Religious figures, nationalists and 
Wilsonian moralists created a front that criticized the Open Door policy and 
advocated to honor the previous promises of the U.S. towards the minorities in 
Turkey. The opponents also despised the idea of establishing an equal 
relationship with a backward, Muslim state that had recently massacred ten of 
thousands of Christian Armenians. During the next four years, they pleaded for the 
rejection of the Treaty. The anti-Open Door front fed its dissatisfaction with the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy by creating a racial, gender and religious rhetoric. 
The work of Kristin Hoganson helps define this phenomenon.
In her book, Fighting for American Manhood, Kristin Hoganson explained the 
origins of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. Hoganson 
convincingly argued that gender politics was an influential factor in the 
determination of U.S. foreign policy.12 According to her, a masculine desire to 
defend American honor drove policy makers to the wars with Spain and the 
Philippines. Hoganson illustrated that before the war with Spain over Cuba, there 
were many accounts depicting Cuba as a female waiting to be rescued from 
Spain.13 This work borrows Hoganson’s illuminating concept of the gender roles in 
U.S. foreign policy and applies it to explain the way in which many individuals 
rallied behind the idea of rescuing Christian women from brutal Turks.
12 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the 
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By using these four interrelated historical approaches as the framework, this 
work illustrates that the U.S. applied an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near 
East from 1908 through 1920’s. Furthermore, it argues that studying the public 
debate over the Lausanne Treaty helps one to understand the way in which 
gender, American honor and religious beliefs provided the policy makers with an 
ideological rationale to oppose the Treaty. Finally, it demonstrates that a small 
state, like Turkey, can create a role for itself in world politics and manipulate the 
big power politics for its interests.
Signed on August 6,1923, the Lausanne Treaty reestablished diplomatic and 
commercial relations between Turkey and the U.S., which had been severed with 
the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917. As I will detail in this thesis, many 
Americans accurately understood that the U.S.’s main objective was to make sure 
that U.S. business interests had an equal share in the Near Eastern markets after 
the Great War. These Americans believed that the U.S. served the interests of big 
corporations, especially the Standard Oil Company of New York, by primarily 
seeking oil concessions in the region. They opposed the premise that Open Door 
should be the driving force of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, due to the Turkish 
massacre of Armenian civilians during the Great War, they believed that ratification 
of the Treaty would legitimize Turkish brutal acts and prevent Armenians from 
building their own country.
In January, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson issued the Fourteen Points that 
the U.S. wanted to accomplish at the end of the Great War. The twelfth point was 
to abolish the Ottoman Empire and create independent national states -  an
7
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Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia was one of them.14 In early 1920’s, because of 
Wilson’s promise, many Americans believed that the U.S. had a legal as well as a 
moral obligation towards the Armenians. The Treaty of Lausanne asked the 
American people to forget Wilson’s promise to create an Armenian state in the 
Near East, disregard the Turkish brutalities against the Christians during the war, 
and be on equal terms with an under-developed Muslim state. Turks’ ill-treatment 
of the Christian subjects was unacceptable to many Americans, who commonly 
believed that young Christian girls were kept in harems in Turkey and forced to 
marry Turkish men.
A combination of anti-Turkish sentiment and disdain for the Open Door policy 
became a hotly debated domestic political issue when the Democratic Party added 
a plank denouncing the Treaty to its election platform in 1924. This politicized anti- 
Turkish and anti-Muslim attitudes, together with a broader dissatisfaction about the 
materialistic direction of U.S. foreign policy, resulted in the rejection of the 
Lausanne Treaty in January 1927.
Although many Americans revolted against the Treaty, there were also 
Americans who supported the idea of establishing equal relations with the new 
Turkish Republic. The supporters believed that the new Turkey was on its way to 
becoming a country guided by rule of law. They claimed that the U.S. business, 
philanthropic and educational interests in the region could be defended only by 
ratifying the Treaty. In other words, Turkish laws would protect the American 
people and properties in the country. When the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty
14 Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1985), 482.
8
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finally came to the Senate floor in January 17, 1927, the Senate could not produce 
the two-thirds majority to ratify the Lausanne Treaty although it did show large 
support for the idea -  while 54 voted for it, 30 rejected it.
A few weeks after the Lausanne Treaty was rejected, President Calvin 
Coolidge asked Admiral Bristol to conclude a new treaty with Turkey. Bristol took 
the train from Constantinople to Angora immediately. In less than two weeks 
Bristol and the Angora government put together a new treaty which fundamentally 
put the Lausanne Treaty into effect. The Democratic Senators who voted against 
the Treaty remained silent for the most part about President Coolidge’s disregard 
of their votes. According to one journalist, the major reason for this silence was the 
fact that many Senators voted against the Treaty just to humiliate the President 
before the upcoming presidential elections.15 After achieving their goal, they did 
not question the President’s unilateral action to establish normal relations with 
Turkey. The most serious response came from William H. King of Utah a year later 
when he introduced a resolution that accused President Coolidge of violating both 
the “spirit and letter of the Constitution.” 16
Although the U.S. Open Door policy in the Near East was attacked by many 
Americans, it ultimately remained intact. This work argues that there were two 
major reasons why the Open Door policy was challenged but not destroyed. First, 
Open Door policy did not meet any resistance from Turkey, and in fact, Turkey
15 Constantine Brown, the Chicago Daily News correspondent at London, to Bristol, February 25, 
1927, Bristol Papers.
16 Resolution 194, April 10, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 69, PT.4-6, PG .3493-6962, 1928 
Cong. 70, Sess. 1, microfilm No. 178, 6142.
9
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openly advocated for U.S. involvement in the Near East. Turkey wanted the U.S. 
to balance the European Allied powers’ imperialistic demands by extending its 
Open Door policy into the Near East. When the first meeting at Lausanne did not 
produce any results in late 1922, Turkey granted the Chester Concessions to gain 
the U.S.’s support for the second round of meetings. In as much as the original 
reason for the U.S.’s participation in the Lausanne Conference was to defend the 
Open Door policy, the Turks made the application of the Open Door policy easy for 
American diplomats.
Secondly, the public movement against the Treaty lost the support of many 
Americans who believed that the criticism of the Treaty had lost touch with reality 
and became mere racial and political propaganda. When the U.S. government 
attempted to normalize its relations with Turkey based on the Lausanne Treaty 
despite its recent rejection by the Senate, there was no strong opposition left to 
mobilize against the government’s decision. This work postulates, therefore, that 
small powers like Turkey influenced U.S. foreign policy by granting incentives. 
Furthermore, a genuine American public movement against an aggressive Open 
Door policy in the Near East lost its legitimacy due to relying on rhetoric based on 
propaganda and generating an unfair racial prejudice against the Turks.
Historiography and Methodology
In the limited historical studies on Turkish-American relations during the 
interwar period, there is not an extensive analysis of the rejection of the Lausanne 
Treaty. The reason for this oversight is that the rejection of the Treaty in January 
1927 did not have much impact on the subsequent relations between the two
10
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countries. After all, relations with Turkey were normalized quickly and historians 
did not pay much attention to Turkish-American relations until the end of the 
Second World War when Turkey became an early recipient of Marshall Plan aid.17 
This work argues, however, that there is much to learn from the debate over the 
Lausanne Treaty.
A detailed historical account of Turkish American relations during the 1920’s 
was written by Leland James Gordon in 1932.18 Gordon’s book on U.S. relations 
with Turkey between 1830 and 1930 from an economic perspective is still the most 
authoritative study on the subject. According to Gordon, after the Lausanne Treaty 
was signed, “an unexpected” opposition emerged in the U.S. By putting the 
rejection of the treaty in their 1924 election plank, the Democratic Party made it a 
political issue.19 Gordon explained that the negative view of the Ottoman Empire 
and Turkey was due to their treatment of non-Muslims which caused the American 
public to have a strong opinion about the treaty.20
An expert on Turkish-American relations between 1914 and 1939, Roger R. 
Trask, rightly claimed that strong religious and Armenian-lobby opposition, as well 
as the partisan struggle between the Republican and the Democratic parties, were
17 For instance, in his book, historian William Hale did not mention the U.S. role at the Lausanne 
Conference. According to him, the major players were Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000  (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 52. Hale claimed that the U.S. 
withdrew from world politics after 1920, 3.
18 Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic 
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the main factors behind the rejection of the ratification.21 By exploring several 
resources in their books, Gordon and Trask created a well defined framework to 
study the subject. But both Gordon’s and Trask’s examinations of the debate about 
the Lausanne Treaty are incomplete. Trask also neglected to address the U.S. 
Open Door policy in the Near East. By ignoring the relationship between the public 
perception of the Lausanne Treaty and the decision making process of the 
politicians, Trask did not identify the ideological origins of U.S. foreign policy.
Although Gordon convincingly established the historical background of the U.S. 
Open Door policy in the Near East, he fell short of admitting its significance to the 
Lausanne negotiations. He also disregarded the channels that the American public 
used to influence the statesmen’s decisions. Furthermore, Gordon did not consider 
the ways in which the Turkish diplomatic maneuvers affected the policy makers 
during the Lausanne Conference. The most serious flaw of the book, however, is 
Gordon’s unquestioning acceptance of the claim by Joseph Grew, the chief U.S. 
negotiator at Lausanne, that Grew was not aware of the Chester Concession 
during the Lausanne negotiations 22 Thus, Gordon missed the most important 
piece in the U.S. foreign relations apparatus at Lausanne which was the Open 
Door policy. The main objective of the U.S. at Lausanne was to protect the 
Chester Concession against Britain.
21 Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914-1939 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 37.
22 Gordon, 33.
12
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After the bloody Great War, many historians believed that Americans wanted to 
go back to “normalcy” and did not want the U.S. to involve itself in world affairs.23 
The failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty in 1919 was considered to be the end of 
Wilsonian idealism. It was believed that the election of 1920 was a referendum for 
internationalism or isolationism and the American people preferred the latter. This 
work, however, provides evidence that the American public was engaged by 
international affairs during the 1920’s and it was their active participation in the 
debate surrounding the Treaty that contributed to its rejection. The type of debate, 
which was based in part on religion and, gender prejudices, the American public 
generated, however, became a turn off for many Americans and undermined the 
movement.
In this thesis, after briefly explaining Ottoman-U.S. relations during the 
nineteenth century, the first chapter focuses on the Open Door policy of President 
William Howard Taft in 1909 and 1910. This chapter generally relies on the 
personal papers of Oscar Solomon Straus, the first Ambassador to the Ottoman 
Empire. The second chapter narrates the Lausanne Treaty negotiations. It argues 
that the U.S.’s main agenda was to implement the Open Door policy in the Near 
East, especially against the imperial schema of Great Britain. Turkish nationalists
23 In his book, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1931  (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), the 
historian John D. Hicks claims that “between 1922 and 1929 the U.S. abdicated its position of 
world leadership, and focused its attention primarily upon domestic affairs,” 49. According to 
Charles O. Lerche Jr., the 1920’s were the “renaissance of isolationism.” Lerche Jr. maintains 
that American people could not understand the meaning of a great-power status and they fought 
World W ar I “with emotional slogans and crusading zeal and without any rational understanding 
of how to approach their idealistic goal.. .for good or ill, Americans once again turned their backs 
on the world.” Foreign Policy of the American People (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
119. The historian Arthur Link maintains that the internationalist coalition that Woodrow Wilson 
put together “gradually disintegrated from 1917 to 1920 and disappeared entirely during the 
campaign of 1920.” “What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?” The Historical 
Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (July 1959), 839.
13
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took advantage of the tension between these great powers, and even increased it, 
by granting the U.S. the Chester Concession during the negotiations. The third 
chapter describes the public debate about the Lausanne Treaty in the U.S. 
between 1923 and 1927. The epilogue explains the reasons why the anti- 
Lausanne Treaty movement did not succeed in preventing the U.S. from officially 
recognizing Turkey, although it influenced the Senate to reject the Treaty.
14
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CHAPTER I
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: U.S. OPEN DOOR POLICY IN TURKEY
Early Years
Since the early years of its establishment, the U.S. wanted to trade in the Near 
East.1 Since piracy was widespread in the Eastern Mediterranean, the first U.S. 
official encounter in the Near East was with the Barbary Pirates. The Barbary 
Pirates were located in Northern Africa and politically attached to the Ottoman 
Empire. Countries that wanted to trade on the Eastern Mediterranean paid tribute 
to these pirates in return for safety. The first Turkish-American meeting took place 
in 1800 when Commodore William Bainbridge brought the U.S. tribute to 
Constantinople.2 Signing an official treaty took another thirty years. The U.S. did 
not want to approach the Ottomans while they were at war with Napoleon’s 
France, thus potentially putting its relations with France at risk.3
The U.S. and the Ottoman Empire eventually concluded a trade treaty in May 
1830. According to this treaty, the Ottoman Empire granted the U.S. extraterritorial 
rights known as capitulations, which the Ottomans had already granted to the
1 Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, Revised Ed. (New York: Atheneum, 
1968), 50-51.
2 Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), 7.
3 Ibid, 9.
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other major European powers.1 Leland Gordon explains capitulations as: “onestate 
exercises certain sovereign functions within the boundaries of another state.”2 
The Ottomans began to grant capitulations after the capture of 
Constantinople from the Byzantium Empire in 1543. After this event, the 
Ottomans, ruled by Islamic laws, became an empire truly and had direct contact 
with Europe. According to the Islamic laws, only Muslims had exclusive rights for 
trade.3 In order to encourage foreign investment in the Empire and not contradict 
with the Islamic lows, the Ottoman Empire granted capitulations to Italian 
merchants. Thus, these merchants would be subject to their own lows rather than 
Ottoman laws.4
Until the beginning of the Great War, however, Turkish-American trade 
remained on a modest level although the two countries maintained friendly 
relations.5 The Ottoman Empire, for instance, was one of the rare countries that 
supported the Union during the Civil War.6 American missionary and humanitarian
1 1bid, 190.
2 Gordon, 190.
3 Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, “The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their 
Abrogation as it Affects the United States” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 17,
No. 2 (April 1923), 208.
4 Ibid, 209.
5 In his book, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century (Albany: 
State University of New York, 1988), the historian Resat Kasaba indicates that during most of the 
nineteenth century Great Britain was the leading trade partner of the Ottoman Empire. The United 
States was the fifth trading partner after France, Austria and Russia, 87.
6 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Hereafter referred to as FRUS), 
1862, Government Printing Office, Washington, 788. Quoted by Gordon, American Relations with 
Turkey, 1830-1930, 12.
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institutions, on the other hand, flourished rapidly during the nineteenth century.7 As 
of 1886-87 there were 419 American schools in the Near East with 16,205 
students who were mainly Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians, and Roman 
Catholics -  only a small number of Muslims attended these schools.8
The First Open Door Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire: Oscar Solomon Straus.
1909-1910
With the dawn of the twentieth century, the U.S. was emerging as an empire. 
A war with Spain over Cuba and Secretary Hay’s Open Door notes signified this 
shift. Consequently, the U.S. perception of the Near East changed. The 1908 
Young Turk revolution against the corrupt Abdulhamid II, and subsequent 
declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Turkey, convinced U.S. policy makers 
that this new country would be receptive to capitalism and American penetration.9 
It was commonly believed among U.S. policy makers that because of its oil 
reserves, additional natural resources, and need for reconstruction; the Near East 
had become as important as China. This marked the beginning of a struggle 
between the U.S. Open Door policy and Old World (German, British, and French) 
imperialism in the Near East.10 U.S. policy makers believed that the Young Turks 
could bring stability and the rule of law to the Ottoman Empire and make it
7 Gordon, 221.
8 Oscar Solomon Straus Papers, Box 1, File: Correspondence January-April 1888, (Manuscript 
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available for American commercial expansion.11 According to State Department 
dispatches of the time, the new Young Turk regime also wanted to encourage U.S. 
investment.12 President Taft and Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox 
welcomed the opportunity to expand the American influence in the region. They 
were committed to maintaining Hay’s Dollar Diplomacy.13
Born in Bavaria, Oscar Solomon Straus came to the U.S. as a child. After 
practicing law in New York, he was appointed as the U.S. Minister to the Ottoman 
Empire from 1887 to 1889, and again during the period of 1898-1901. Later, he 
was the Secretary of Commerce and Labor during the Theodore Roosevelt 
administration, 1906-1909. Afterwards, President Taft appointed him as the first 
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1909. The next year, he resigned from this 
post citing private reasons. His private papers, however, indicated that his 
discontent with the policies of the Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox 
(1853-921), was the primary reason for his resignation.
In the summer of 1908, the Young Turks, mostly military officers calling 
themselves the Committee of Union and Progress, instigated a revolution against 
the Sultan Abdulhamid II and forced him to reintroduce the 1876 constitution.14
11 The New York Times (NYT), Oct. 30, 1910, “Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey.”
12 Lewis Einstein, charge d'affaires to Knox, July 15, 1909, Embassy Archives, Dispatches to the 
State Department, July 3, 1909 to December 29, 1909, Vol. 32. RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 10, 
Compartment 5, Shelf 1. United States National Archives, Washington.
13 Herbert F. Wright; “Philander Chase Knox” in The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomacy, Vol. IX, Ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, INC, 1963), 
327.
14 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 94.
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The new regime consolidated its power in April 1909 by deposing Abdulhamid II.15 
The U.S. reaction to the reestablishment of the parliamentary regime was positive. 
The acting U.S. Ambassador, John G. A. Leishman, predicted that the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire would be halted by the Young Turks. He also predicted that 
the Ottoman Empire would become a “highly civilized and progressive nation” 
thanks to its natural resources.16 U.S. policy makers believed that the constitution 
and the parliament would help to make the country stable for commercial 
expansion.
In 1909, Straus’ term as Secretary of Commerce and Labor expired with the 
Roosevelt Administration. While Straus planned to return to his law practice in New 
York, President Taft and Secretary Knox offered him the Constantinople post.17 
Taft and Knox told him that in view of the regime changes that had occurred in the 
Empire, he was the most qualified man for the ambassador position.18 The epoch- 
making events occurring in the Turkish Empire provided challenges and 
opportunities, which made that post take on an even greater significance. They 
made it clear that the President needed his expertise and keen knowledge.19 
Straus was not interested in the job as he had already worked there twice. Given
15 Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople, April 15, 1909. FRUS, 1909 
(Washington: Government Printing Press, 1914), 563.
16 Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople , September 28, 1908. FRUS, 
1908 (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1912), 749.
17 Oscar Solomon Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey -  Random Notes, the Following Letters 
from President Taft and Secretary Knox Explain Themselves”, an unpublished diary in Oscar 
Solomon Straus Papers, Box 23, Diary 1909-10, 2 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
18 Ibid.
19 Knox to Straus, April 29,1909, Box 23, File: Correspondence 1909-10, Straus papers, 2.
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the choice, he would have preferred to go to Japan.20 When the President of the 
United States told him that it was his patriotic duty to accept the Constantinople 
post, however, Straus felt he could not decline the offer21
The relationship between Ambassador Straus and Secretary Knox was 
troublesome. While Knox wanted to penetrate the region economically, Straus was 
always skeptical about the possibility for America’s expansion in the Ottoman 
Empire without getting entangled in Old World politics.22 Knox considered the Near 
East as economically significant as China, but Straus strongly believed that any 
major American investment in the Near East meant entanglement in the Eastern 
Question, namely the partition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.23 Knox expected 
Straus to negotiate concessions for the building of railroads, mines and irrigation 24 
Straus, on the other hand, considered these ventures extremely dangerous as 
they would put the U.S. at odds with the major European powers as they were 
deeply involved with the internal politics of the country.
Ironically, at a time when the U.S. government decided to increase its 
economic influence and seek business opportunities overseas, the man they sent 
as the first full ambassador to the Ottoman Empire opposed this shift in U.S. 
foreign policy. Previously, Straus’s responsibilities focused mostly on advocating
20 President Taft to Straus, March 16,1909, Box 12, File: Correspondence March 1909, ibid.
21 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey”.
22 For an excellent narrative of the tension between Knox and Straus, see Naomi W. Cohen, 
“Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy,” The Mississippi Valley 
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for the rights of American religious and philanthropic institutions, especially 
American schools. In his third mission to the Ottoman Empire, however, the 
Department expected Straus to lay the foundation for the big American capitalists’ 
expansion into the Near East. During his short ambassadorship in the Ottoman 
Empire, two important matters came up. First, Straus was expected to convince 
the Ottoman government to allow American companies to bid for the enlargement 
of the Ottoman Navy on equal terms as their British counterparts. The second 
issue was the Chester Concession, a railway system that covered the entire 
Eastern Anatolia and connected it to the oil reserves of today's Iraq. This 
proposed railway network planned to extended from Baghdad and Mosul to both 
the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Straus failed to deliver what Knox wanted on 
both issues.
Straus’ first task was to enable American companies to bid for the Ottoman 
navy enlargement program in early January 1910. The Ottoman Empire had lost 
the majority of its domain in Europe by then. The newly emerged independent 
states -  Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia -  now were on the offensive against the Sick 
Man of Europe, and Greece coveted the island of Crete. The Ottoman 
government, on the other hand, refused to relinquish Crete without a fight. 
However they lacked the necessary forces to defend the island. This prompted the 
Young Turks to move towards modernizing the Ottoman fleet.
After the Greek army entered into politics and dominated the government and 
parliament, it forced the king to consent to the summoning of a National Assembly
21
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that would consist of delegates from around the country.25 Crete decided to send 
delegates to this National Assembly, which declared the island as a part of 
Greece. For the Young Turkish government this move was a casus belli.26 Bulgaria 
was also preparing to take advantage of the situation between Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire to make war upon Turkey either in conjunction with some of the 
Balkan powers or by uniting with Greece. Greece had recently purchased in Italy a 
man-of-war (armed naval vessel) of about ten thousand tons. Turkey was trying to 
match that by purchasing a man-of-war of comparable size and power.
On January 19, 1910, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs presented Straus 
with a memorandum showing the size of the ship and the strength of its 
armaments that the Porte desired to purchase.27 The foreign minister promised 
Straus that American shipbuilding firms could come to Turkey to submit bids 28 
Straus sent a telegraph to the Department about the project. The Department 
replied that they could not sell naval vessels without the consent of Congress and 
this would require some time.29 Knox asked Straus to find out if any part of the 
award was open to competition and if so to give effective and appropriate support 
to the representatives of the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company and those of 
such other reputable American firms as may wish to enter the competition.30
25 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 40.
26 Ibid.
. 27 Ibid.
28 Straus to the Secretary of State, April 7, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 3.
29 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 41.
30 Straus to the Secretary of State, April 12, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid.
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Several companies, including the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company, Bethlehem 
Steel, and a few shipbuilding companies, were already interested in the project.
In April, the Ottoman Cabinet decided in favor of a naval program involving an 
annual expenditure of two million five hundred thousand dollars for a period of 
eight years and providing for the construction of two battleships, three cruisers and 
ten destroyers.31 This project was to be undertaken by British firms. Straus knew 
that due to British political pressure, the Ottomans could not wait for the Americans 
to get involved.32 The Minister of Marine told Straus that in order not to embarrass 
the other powers they did not want to open the order to competition.33 He assured 
Straus, however, that if the British bid fell through the U.S. was next in line for 
consideration.34 This fait accompli, according to Secretary Knox, became an 
embarrassment for the American interests in the region. Furthermore, Knox 
accused Straus of lack of deliberation and care in furthering U.S. commercial 
interests in the region. Straus also was angered by the commercial companies that 
blamed either the Department or him for the failure of the Ottoman government to 
follow up on its promises.35
In early March 1910, Straus was preparing to board the Embassy stationary, 






36 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 53.
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his brother and his wife. Being fascinated by historical monuments, he could not 
wait to visit the Greek ruins.37 Afterwards, Straus’s plan was to meet Theodore 
Roosevelt in Egypt at the end of his Africa trip. Straus had an overwhelming 
respect for Roosevelt. Through the years they remained close family friends. He 
was looking forward to exploring the Pyramids together and hearing Roosevelt’s 
many fascinating African hunting adventure stories. A long cable from the State 
Department upset his plans.
The State Department indicated that they were unaware of Straus’ vacation 
schedule. At a time when the U.S. interests were seeking important concessions in 
the Ottoman Empire, it was not advisable for him to depart. He wired back to the 
State Department indicating that there was nothing else he could do as far as the 
enlargement of the Ottoman Navy issue was concerned. He believed that the 
decision making process would take several weeks if not months. Furthermore, he 
was uncomfortable by the extreme desire to push commercial enterprises with 
more energy than understanding on the part of the State Department. Annoyed by 
Straus’ attitude, Knox told him to continue his trip to Egypt to meet Roosevelt, but 
expedite his return.38 When he returned from Egypt in early April, there was a 
telegram from Knox waiting on his desk. Straus could almost hear Knox’s scolding 
voice when he read the telegram. According to Knox, Straus was wrong when he 
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receive bids from American ship builders for the construction of several war 
vessels.39
The second issue Straus devoted much of his time to in Constantinople was 
later to be known as the Chester Concessions. Through its local representatives, 
Mr. Colby M. Chester and Mr. Colt, the American Development Company sought a 
railway concession in Asia Minor. On March 6,1910 at a dinner in the Dolmabahce 
Palace, Halajian Efendi, the Minister of Public Works, informed Straus that he had 
concluded negotiations in regard to the railway concession with the American 
group.40 Halajian Efendi was anxious to bring American capital into Turkey 41 
This railway concession worried Straus about the strategy the U.S. was 
developing in the region. During his visit in Turkey in 1898, the German Emperor 
obtained a concession for building the Baghdad Railway.42 Presently the railway 
reached the city of Konya in central Anatolia and the Germans expected to expand 
it to Basra in the Persian Gulf.43 Since the Gulf region was England’s sphere of 
influence, Straus projected that there would be a crisis in the region within a few 
years. By gaining the Chester Concession, the U.S. would get drawn into this on 
coming train wreck, as it would directly clash with the preexisting German projects 






44 Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 2.
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Empire was the last thing the U.S. should have looked for. The American 
Ambassador in Berlin informed Straus that Germany was uneasy about the 
Ottoman-American Development Company’s railway concession in Asia Minor.45 
Straus later learned that the German Ambassador in Constantinople informed the 
Ottoman government that Germany opposed the granting of the American 
concession 46
Straus believed that the political and commercial interests of foreign states 
were closely allied in the Ottoman Empire 47 Great powers, such as Germany, 
France, and England, had the purpose of furthering their political interests, and 
they leveraged their political interests to push their commercial interests 48 Big 
scale commercial interests, according to Straus, would need the strong and 
consistent arm of the government for protection against unjust treatment.49 This, in 
turn, would draw the U.S. into the political muddle of the “Eastern Question,” either 
on the side of Turkey or on the side of England or Germany.50 By pushing Dollar 




48 Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey,” 74.
49 Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 6.
50 Ibid, 5.
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would lead the U.S. to disastrous international entanglements.51 In early August, 
Straus decided to face Knox directly, discuss his views, and then resign.52
Straus visited Knox in late October 1910 and told him that he did not want to 
return to Constantinople. He also cautioned Knox that large concessions would 
cause possible political entanglements in the region.53 He explained to Knox that 
the concession for the railroad should be obtained only with the backing of the U.S. 
government in cooperation with the European powers 54 Knox responded that 
since the Chester Concession had already progressed thus far, the U.S. should 
continue to press for its conclusion. But if the Ottoman-American Development 
Company backed out, the U.S. government should determine its policy so that it 
would stay out of political entanglements.55 When Straus left Knox’s office, he felt 
an instant relief and believed that he finally made his case in opposition to the 
“paramount policy of eager desire of the administration to make a great showing of 
advancing commercial interests regardless of consequences.”56
That same day he met with President Taft. Straus honestly confessed to the 
President that he found working in Turkey discouraging because of the relationship 
between concessions and politics.57 He continued drawing a distinction between
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the necessary foreign policy in Central and South America and the Far East where 
U.S. commercial and political interests complemented one another, versus in the 
Ottoman Empire where the U.S. had no political interests. While Straus did not 
foresee any potential clash of interests in these other regions with the European 
powers, he believed that the Near East was going to be the cause of a general 
European war.58 According to him, the U.S. involvement in the Eastern Question 
indicated a serious departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy.59
A New York Times article summed up the differences between Secretary Knox 
and Straus: Knox wanted to push for economic expansion rapidly without regard to 
potential political consequences. Straus, on the other hand, wanted to proceed 
with aggressive economic expansion only when it was diplomatically possible.60 
Straus was never against international business. He believed that they were living 
in an age of international commerce, and the people of the U.S. were in the 
forefront, “both in the reward they reap and in the prosperity they enjoy.”61 
According to Straus, international commerce could bring international peace for the 
first time in human history. Commerce in its modern development was based upon 
mutuality, and every ship that carried its products to foreign countries was a 
messenger of peace and good will.62 If peace and American ethical standards
58 Ibid, 138.
59 Ibid, 99.
60 The New York Times, October 30, 1910, “Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey.”
61 Address as Secretary of Commerce and Labor at the Anniversary Celebration of the Savannah 
Board of Trade, April 3, 1908, published by the Government Printing Office, 1908, found at Straus 
Papers, Box 23, Diary 1908-1909, 6.
62 Ibid, 7.
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were not maintained in international commerce, however, the U.S. was on the way 
to becoming a “degenerate” country.63 Straus devoted the rest of his career at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to attain diplomatic harmony among nations.
After Straus resigned in 1910, the Ottoman Empire stumbled from one war to 
another over the next ten years. Due to the instability in the region and the U.S.’s 
entrance into the Great War, American policy makers paused their pursuit of an 
aggressive Open Door policy. In 1919, led by the new U.S. High Commissioner to 
the Ottoman Empire, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, the U.S. renewed its Open 
Door policy effort at a new and unprecedented level.
The late government official and diplomatic historian Herbert Feis (1893- 
1972) called the 1920’s the decade when Dollar Diplomacy was prevalent.64 His 
assessment describes U.S. activities in the Near East for the first half of the 
1920’s when there was a consensus among policy makers and the business 
class that American capital should go to wherever it was needed and there was a 
potential for profit. After the U.S. signed the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey in 
1923, however, there was a significant minority opinion in the U.S. that policy 
makers acted immorally in order to maintain an Open Door policy in the Near 
East. The next chapter illustrates the U.S. Open Door policy during the early 
1920’s, and demonstrates the origins of the opposition to Open Door policy.
63 His Address, as Secretary of Commerce and Labor, at the Annual Banquet of the Traffic Club of 
Philadelphia, The Union League, PA, February 27, 1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office 
1909), ibid, 5.
64 Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932  (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon 
Books, 1965), v.
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CHAPTER II
KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN AT LAUSANNE CONFERENCE
The U.S. Open Door Policy in the Near East during 1920’s
Unlike previous wars, nations waged the Great War by relying on tanks and 
airplanes. Towards the end of the War, it became clear that an increasingly 
important component of a nation’s strength depended upon its oil reserves and 
steel production capacity. Hoping to maintain its imperial power after the War, 
Britain coveted the oil reserves of the Near East as its victory price. The United 
States, meanwhile, proved that it had become perhaps the most powerful nation 
both economically and militarily by 1920. The U.S. also recognized the importance 
of the Near Eastern oil reserves for its future. During their peace negotiations with 
the remnants of the Ottoman Empire first, and later the successor Turkey, the U.S. 
strove to keep the region open to all investors regardless of their nationalities. 
Britain, on the other hand, sought sole control of the Mesopotamian oil reserves in 
today’s Iraq.
After the Great War, a triumphant Woodrow Wilson envisioned a League of 
Nations under the leadership of the U.S. that would replace the Balance of Power 
diplomacy that previously guided international relations prior to the war. Wilson 
believed that the League of Nations would provide an environment in which all 
countries were obliged to conduct their foreign relations peacefully through open
30
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dialogue and negotiation. He insisted that the 1920 presidential election was going 
to be a referendum on this new world order, which the Senate had rejected in 
1919.1 His opponent, Warren Harding, promised to take the American people back 
to “normalcy.”2 Harding trusted that many Americans did not want the U.S. to get 
involved with the world’s political affairs too closely. His election motto was to roll 
back the Wilsonian era to the true nature of U.S. diplomacy that detested 
entangling alliances. According to historian Charles Lerche Jr., the American 
people fought the Great War with a “crusading zeal” without understanding “the 
meaning of great-power status.” This confusion, Lerche concludes, led the 
American people to reject Wilson’s world-community vision.3
Two interrelated beliefs influenced U.S. foreign policy during the 1920’s: fear of 
the collapse of the world economy, and distrust of politicians and bureaucrats who 
failed to prevent the Great War. American policy makers and businessmen 
assumed that the U.S. could not maintain its wealth when the major customer 
nations could not buy American industrial and agricultural products. The conviction 
that U.S. wealth depended upon a stable world economy led policy makers to 
encourage American businessmen to invest overseas. Thus, policy makers and 
the business class believed that in order to open new frontiers for American 
businesses, the U.S. needed to invest in war-damaged nations so that they would
1 Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 44-45.
2 L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933  (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1968), 4.
3 Charles O. Lerche Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1961), 119.
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generate their own wealth. In his book, historian Michael J. Hogan described this 
consensus between the policy makers and American businesses as an “Informal 
Entente.”4 According to Hogan, both parties would take “cooperative action” in 
order to “achieve peace and prosperity.” In this cooperation, Hogan maintains,
U.S. administrations during the 1920’s protected private interests abroad.5 Another 
historian, Herbert Feis, concurs and claims that as a result the Harding, the 
Coolidge and Hoover administrations actively encouraged foreign investment.6
After an interregnum period during which the Wilson administration based its 
foreign policy on internationalism and moral leadership, the U.S. returned to the 
Open Door policy after the election of Warren Harding. Once again, Philander 
Chase Knox’s style of commerce-based diplomacy became fashionable, although 
it met with occasional setbacks. In the case of relations with Turkey, the opposition 
to the Open Door policy was overwhelming because it unified different sections of 
U.S. society. These sections consisted of church leaders and their followers, 
Wilsonian politicians some of whom were opportunists, and those who 
categorically rejected establishing relations with Muslims. This opposition to the 
Open Door policy differed philosophically from Straus’s more than a decade 
earlier. In his time, Straus had disapproved the Open Door policy because it paid 
no attention to the traditional balance of power in the Near East and potentially 
positioned the U.S. in opposition to the European powers. Straus was not against
4 Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American 
Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928  (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).
5 Ibid, 1.
6 Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 5-6.
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the idea of free trade nor dealing with Muslims. Straus clashed with Knox because 
he believed Knox’s foreign policy to be unnecessarily confrontational. As a 
pragmatic diplomat, Straus concluded that the profit the U.S. may earn in the Near 
East would be less than the risk it took by agitating Britain and Germany. During 
the twenties, however, as the following pages will demonstrate, the opponents of 
the Open Door policy in the Turkish case were predominantly Wilsonian— 
moralistic and idealistic. They claimed that the Open Door policy was immoral and 
damaged U.S. honor.
In early 1920’s, it was a common belief among policy makers and 
businessmen that the American market would not be sufficient for American 
producers in the near future. That was why it was important to look for new 
markets. In addition, many American businessmen were convinced that they could 
conduct more peaceful international relations than politicians and diplomats.7 After 
all, these politicians and diplomats were responsible for the most destructive war in 
history. The American business class welcomed the opportunity to use their 
surplus money and manufacturing goods around the world. In their second World 
Congress at Rome in 1923, for instance, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) declared that businessmen from all nations would maintain the peace rather 
than the “ignorant and impractical politicians and bureaucrats.”8
7 In his book, The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933  (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1957), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. claims that after the war there was “an age of business” 
when “an economic success and metaphysics of optimism” were predominant, 71.
8 Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June 1-31 1923, Mark 
Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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At the conference, the ICC adopted a resolution that accused the Old World 
regimes of failing catastrophically by causing the Great War and dragging 
humanity into the biggest tragedy.9 According to the resolution, businessmen did 
not have a political agenda -  they worked for the enhancement of profit and that 
was good for the masses. Fred I. Kent, Vice President of Bankers Trust Company 
of New York, said that “the impracticable, the ignorant and the vicious” political 
leaders caused misery and disasters for the masses. The time, he asserted, had 
come for businessmen to stop this destructive system.10 With its resources, 
namely oil, and the potential to be a new market place, the Near East was one of 
the destinations on which the ICC focused.
That same year, the ICC published the “Report of the Present Situation in 
Turkey December 1922.”11 This report was based largely on contacts made 
through American officials of the State Department and the courtesy of the 
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. According to this report, although 
industries were non-existent in Turkey, the country was rich with mineral wealth 
such as gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, coal and oil.12 The oil fields of Mosul 
discovered by the Germans, the report claimed, had become one of the biggest 
victory prizes for the Allied forces. Additionally, the copper deposits in eastern 
Anatolia were reputed to be among the richest in the world. The report concluded
9 Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4 ,1923 , ibid.
10 Ibid, 7.
11 Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 12,1923, Box 39,
File: Correspondence March, 1-31, 1923, ibid.
12 Ibid, 9.
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that the Asiatic possessions of Turkey constituted a promising market for the 
products of industrial Europe and America.13 Although American capital was 
welcome almost anywhere in the world, the U.S. struggled to have a foothold in 
the Near Eastern oil reserves because of the British dominant imperial presence 
in the region.14
Under the leadership of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, 
Britain built a division of fast battleships fed by oil between 1911 and 1914.15 After 
this transition in its navy, having steady access to oil supplies became a national 
policy for Britain. The Great War reemphasized the importance of oil for the 
industrialized countries.16 Towards the end of the Great War, the British 
government declared that it was going to be their fixed policy to keep aliens out of 
oil properties both in the British dominions and in foreign neutral countries.17
The U.S. Navy also converted their ships from coal burners to oil burners 
before the war.18 Since the U.S. was using the reserves within its own borders and 
in Mexico until the end of the War, American policy makers did not need a 
concrete foreign oil supply policy until the end of the Great W ar.19 The U.S.
13 Ibid.
14 Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 48.
15 John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World W ar I," The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 4. (March 1955), 654.
16 Ibid, 656.
17 DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (July, 1956), 860.
18 DeNovo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World W ar I,” 641.
19 Ibid.
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appreciated the significance of oil not only as an indispensable fuel but also as a 
lubricant after its wartime experience.20 At the end of the war, oil experts 
concluded that the U.S. had only thirty years worth of oil reserves.21 The oil 
industry and government officials now considered that the national interests were 
in serious jeopardy due to the depletion of domestic petroleum reserves and British 
inroads into the remaining promising oil fields of the world, particularly those of 
Asia Minor22 U.S. oil companies realized that by 1919 the British companies, 
which were currently turning out less than five per cent of the world’s production, 
had acquired more than half the world’s estimated future reserves, mostly through 
the Turkish Petroleum Company.23 Although the U.S. declared that it did not have 
any expansionist ambitions before the war, the U.S. government advocated for the 
Open Door principle, which would give equal access to all powers and forbid any 
exclusive rights in the Middle East after the war.24 Britain, on the other hand, 
viewed the Near Eastern resources as its ultimate Great War victory prize.
In 1914, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands had agreed to share the oil 
reserves of the Near East by establishing the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) -  
half owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (British), a quarter by Dutch Shell, 
and a quarter by a German company. The TPC obtained the exclusive rights to
^ibid
21 DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920,” 857.
22 Ibid, 874.
23 Ibid, 865.
24 Edward Mead Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum C o m p an y -A  Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy” 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1924), 265.
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exploit the vast oil deposits of Mosul and Baghdad from the Ottoman government 
the same year.25 After the war, the German shares in the company were nullified, 
and an Anglo-French-Dutch monopoly was created in mandated Iraq.26
In April 1920, Britain and France came together in San Remo, Italy to 
conclude the partition of the previously Ottoman-ruled areas. At the conference, 
France took over the German shares of TPC, and Britain and France established 
complete authority over the Mesopotamian oil fields.27 Britain planned to establish 
a pipe line from Mesopotamia through Syria (then under French mandate) to the 
Eastern Mediterranean 28 The San Remo Treaty, according to the U.S. 
government, ran counter to their Open Door policy. The U.S. Secretary of State, 
Bainbridge Colby, protested the San Remo agreement on the grounds that the 
mandated areas were to be administered and kept open to all the nations.29 
Colby further indicated that Near Eastern oil “interested public opinion in the U.S. 
as a potential subject of international strife.”30
25 Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 50-51.
26 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 
572.
27 Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum Company,” 273.
OQ
Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 51.
29 Edward Mead Earl, “The Turkish Petroleum Company,” 274.
30 Mr. Colby to Lord Curzon, November 20, 1920: “Correspondence between His Majesty’s 
Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated 
Territories,” Parliamentary Papers. Command, 675, 1921. Cited by Feis, The Diplomacy of the 
Dollar, 52.
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American oil companies were also interested in investing in the region.31 
During the early 1920’s, U.S. policy makers and American businesses, especially 
the Standard Oil Company, pursued an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near 
East. Unlike the reluctant Open Door diplomat Oscar Solomon Straus, this time the 
U.S. had an ideally suited representative in the region. During his tenure in Turkey 
between 1919 and 1927, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol devoted his time to 
protecting U.S. commercial interests by combating the Allied’s attempt to 
colonize the region and negotiating concessions with the Turkish government.
Mark Lambert Bristol: An Open Door Diplomat in Constantinople
The Wilson administration assigned Admiral Mark Bristol as the High 
Commissioner to Constantinople to protect U.S. institutions and interests in the 
Allied-occupied Near East in August 1919. Earlier Bristol served with distinction as 
commander of a naval ship in European waters.32 He was also a member of the 
International Armistice Commission in Belgium in November 1918.33 Bristol made 
opening the door for the Standard Oil Company his top priority by revitalizing the 
earlier Chester Concession.34 The Standard Oil Company supported the Chester 
Concession partly because one of the railway concessions included the rights to
31 Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study of Economic Equality 
Before and Since the Establishment of the Mandate System (London: George Allen & Unwin 
LTD., 1930), 141.
32 Dr. C. F. Gates, President of Robert College, Constantinople, “The Departure of Admiral Bristol,” 
The Levant Trade Review, May 1927, Vol. XV, No. 5, 183, found at Box 91, Album-News Clippings, 
Bristol Papers.
33 Ibid.
34 Bristol to Secretary of State Sept. 7 ,1921, Box 72 File: Ottoman Empire - Commercial 
Jan-Dec.1921, ibid.
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exploit the underground resources of the region, especially Mosul’s oil fields. It did 
not want to abandon this source of wealth to the British Turkish Petroleum 
Company.35
Bristol was a quintessential Open Door diplomat of his time. He believed that 
current foreign policy should be governed by financial and commercial 
considerations, and the future reconstruction of the world should be based upon 
advice from financial and commercial circles. Bristol believed that the U.S. could 
assist underdeveloped countries by helping them to create strong economies. He 
was convinced that political problems would be resolved if people rallied around 
quality of life issues as opposed to ideological or nationalist ones.36 He was 
convinced that it was the U.S.’s obligation to help the Turks establish their new 
government and new laws.37
Bristol believed that during the war and its aftermath, the religious and 
sentimental conduct of foreign affairs masked the real issues. According to Bristol, 
idealistic and moralistic goals were accomplished most effectively by practical 
means, such as fixing the economic problems of nations.38 He was convinced that 
Dollar Diplomacy would result in peace among nations and would help the U.S. to 
find markets for its surplus products. The Admiral thought that the U.S. should take
35 Miller Joblin, General Manager of Standard Oil Company of NY to Bristol, November 29,1922, 
Box 38 File: Correspondence Nov. 1 -3 0  1922, Bristol Papers.
36 Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1- 
31 1923, ibid, 9.
37 Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 12,1923, ibid, 4.
38 Bristol to Allen W. Dulles, Dept of State, January 19, 1923, Box 38, File: Correspondence Dec. 1- 
29 1922, ibid, 6.
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part in the solution of the economic problems of the world and it should start in the 
Near East by providing “assistance, advice and sympathy.”39 Bristol believed just 
as strongly that the U.S. needed to have foreign markets to absorb its surplus 
production of all kinds.40 In the near future, U.S. production capacity wouJd exceed 
demand. Therefore, the U.S. should begin to look for new markets because “in a 
very few years the old European countries that were knocked out by the Great War 
would be back on their feet” and demand their share 41 Britain was already 
demanding the resources of the Near East for itself.
In 1919 when Bristol arrived in Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman 
Empire, it had been under Allied occupation for almost a year. It took the Allied 
governments another year to make a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire 
because their first priority was to deal with Germany. The Allied governments and 
the Ottoman Empire finally signed the Sevres Treaty near Paris in the summer of 
1920, which certified the British mandate over Iraq and Palestine, French 
dominance in Syria and Lebanon, and Greek control of western Asia Minor and 
Thrace. Several islands including Rhodes on the Aegean Sea were given to 
Italy; Armenians and the Kurds were slated to have a national land in Eastern 
Anatolia; and the Turks would have a small national land in central Anatolia. 
Although the Ottoman government signed the treaty, a Turkish nationalist 
movement was growing rapidly against the occupation of Asia Minor by Greece.
39 Bristol to T.C. Perkins, Perkins and Company, January 25,1924, Box 41 File: Correspondence 
Dec. 15-31 1923, ibid.
40 Bristol to Julius H. Barnes, President of the Chamber of Commerce, October 30, 1923, Box 40, 
File: Correspondence July 1-31 1923, ibid, 3.
41 Ibid.
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In May 1919, Greek forces crossed the Aegean Sea and occupied Smyrna. 
This occupation and their movement towards central Anatolia caused an uproar 
among many Turks. During the next two years, under the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), the Turks rejected the terms of the Sevres Treaty and 
fought a successful war against Greek occupation. Thus, in early 1921, there 
were two governments, the Ottoman government in Constantinople and the 
Turkish nationalist government in Angora. Sensing the strength and possible 
success of the Angora government, the American High Commission decided to 
open negotiations with them. In fact, the Russian, French and Italian 
governments already had diplomatic relations with the nationalists. The French 
and Italians were trading with the nationalists through the cities of Samsun and 
Trabzon on the Black Sea region.42 In need of money and legitimacy, the 
nationalists welcomed relations with the U.S. and wanted American companies 
to invest in the region.
The U.S. High Commission and the Angora government began to 
communicate in early 1921. Julian Gillespie, the U.S. Commercial Attache, 
helped Bristol to identify investment opportunities and revitalize the Chester 
Concession. Late in March, C. K. Streit, journalist from the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, returned from a visit to the Angora government and informed Gillespie 
that Mustapha Kemal Pasha and other high officials of the nationalist
42 Julian Gillespie to the Director of the Department of Commerce, MacElwee, 31 March 1921, 
Constantinople. RG 151 Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, General 
Records, 1914 -  1958. Trade Promotion Europe, Near East, Canada, & Alaska 448, Russia 
(Trade w/U.S, 1939-Vanderlip)-449, Near East (Arabia) (Hereafter referred to as RG 151) Box 
No. 1990. Entry 1. (RG 151, Stack Area 570, Row 52, Compartment 23, Shelf 07, United States 
National Archives, College Park). Folder: Turkey -  Discrimination Against American Interests.
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government wanted a commercial representative of the American government 
to come to Angora.43 The nationalists needed agricultural machinery, 
automobiles, trucks and railroad equipment in Anatolia. They preferred U.S. 
investment because they believed that unlike Britain, the U.S. had no political 
ambitions for the region. In another instance, Robert McDowell, an American 
relief worker at Samsun, informed Admiral Bristol that officials of the Angora 
government repeatedly requested that a U.S. commercial delegate be sent to 
Angora to talk over possible business relations.44
Gillespie suggested to the Department of Commerce that an official trip to 
Anatolia would be beneficial to U.S. interests. He proposed to secure information 
concerning construction of railway lines -  the Chester Concession -  that would 
connect major Anatolian cities. Gillespie was also interested in finding out the 
extent of agricultural machinery needs in Anatolia, as well as discovering other 
materials for import such as tobacco, opium, wool and mohair45 From late 
December 1921 to early January 1922, Gillespie spent time in and around 
Angora making inquiries concerning the economic situation, transportation 
facilities, mines and ports of Anatolia with a view to interesting American capital 
investment46 At the end, he was convinced that there were many opportunities 




46 Bosphore, Dec. 29, 1921, RG 151, ibid.
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Gillespie’s assessment and promised to assist American capitalists.47 Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha told Gillespie that he would be pleased to see American capital 
participate in the task of recreating Anatolia.48
Gillespie informed Bristol that the Turks were going to fight till the end to 
regain the national pact territories 49 He reported that the Turks seemed to be 
tolerant towards Christians but there was an antagonism to the interference of 
religion in politics, whether Christian or Muslim. They did not have Bolshevik 
inclinations and fully realized that both their religious and economic organization 
precluded Bolshevism. They were eager to give America options on certain 
construction work and natural resources in order to prevent monopolization of the 
European Powers through the peace treaty. There was a disposition to revive the 
Chester Concession and a willingness to discuss American participation in the 
exploitation of Kurdistan’s oil.50
Admiral Bristol played a major role in obtaining the concession.51 He believed 
that such a business venture would permit the U.S. to legitimately influence 
European political affairs without the U.S. government’s entering into any 
entangling alliances.52 The State Department gave a green light to Bristol to
47 Aksam, January 4, 1922, ibid.
48 Le Reveils January 2, 1922, ibid.
4Q
Bristol to Secretary of State, Feb. 21, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922,
Bristol Papers.
50 Ibid, 2.
51 Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1- 
31 1923), ibid, 5.
52 Ibid, 8.
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support the Chester Concession. In a telegram dated 1922, Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes asked Bristol to keep the Department informed about the 
status of the Chester negotiations with the Angora government, with a special 
reference to territory covered and modifications of any original projects.53 Around 
the same time, Admiral Bristol provided Arthur Chester, the son of the man who 
obtained the original concession in 1909, with an official letter so that he could 
travel around Anatolia freely and sign a concession deal with the Angora 
government.54 Turkish officials promised that they would seek to pass the 
concession in the Parliament.
While Bristol was attending the first Lausanne conference in 1922, Arthur 
Chester sent him a letter and requested that the U.S. support the Chesters’ claims 
in Mosul. Chester explained that the Turks hoped to harm the British claims in the 
region by encouraging American investment in Mosul.55 Chester further explained 
that according to his father, Mosul was not a part of Mesopotamia. Since it was 
east of the Tigris River, it was not included in the English mandate, and therefore it 
was legally an integral part of Turkey.56 Chester concluded that U.S. government 
support would have great bearing on the value of the concession.57 Bristol and the 
State Department heard this request and crafted their Lausanne strategy around 
supporting the Chester Concession.
53 Hughes to Bristol, November 29, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922, ibid.
54 U.S. High Commission Office at Constantinople to Bristol at Lausanne, November 29, 1922, Box 
69 File: Lausanne Conference 1922. On this document, Chester requests another support letter 
similar to one he received from Bristol in August 1921, ibid.
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First Conference
At the end of 1922, the Greek army in Asia Minor was crushed by the Turkish 
nationalists. The Allied powers accepted the fact that they could not impose the 
Sevres Treaty upon the Turks anymore. In order to resolve the Eastern question 
once and for all, the Allied governments and the countries around Turkey sent their 
finest diplomats to the Alpine city of Lausanne in Switzerland in November 1922. 
They wanted to pressure the Turks into signing a treaty that would allow them to 
establish their own semi-autonomous country. The Allied powers wanted Turkey to 
pay for war reparations as well as to maintain the capitulations. They hoped that 
the new Turkish nationalist government would sign a watered down version of the 
Sevres Treaty. Having just beaten the Greeks on the battle field and consolidated 
their power in Anatolia, however, the Turks came to Lausanne self-confident and 
with a desire to have complete independence. The Turks believed that they held 
enough cards to abolish the capitulations and gain as much territory as possible.
The U.S. government decided to attend the Lausanne Conference just as an 
observer. Although they joined the Great War on different sides, the Ottoman 
Empire and the U.S. never officially declared war on each other. Therefore, the 
U.S. policy makers did not think it was necessary for the U.S. to officially make 
peace with the Turks. When the U.S. entered the Great War on the side of the 
Allied powers in 1917, the Ottoman Empire severed its relations with the U.S. and 
denounced the capitulations as the basis of their relations.58 The U.S.’s objective
58 Edward W . Turlington, “The American Treaty of Lausanne” World Peace Foundation 
Pamphlets (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), 565.
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at Lausanne was to re-establish pre-war relations with the Turkish government -  
maintain the capitulations, prevent the Allies from establishing spheres of influence 
in the Near East, and protect the newly emerging Chester Concession.
It was additionally important to the Department of Commerce that the U.S. 
should be represented at Lausanne because the present occupation regime 
excluded the Americans and prevented them from investing freely in the region. 
The entire U.S. standing in this part of the world, the commercial attache Paul 
Edwards maintained, could be injured. According to Edwards, Turkey was a 
gateway to the Danube countries, Southern Russia, Transcaucasia, Turkistan, 
Persia and Anatolia, and “any discussion of a revision of the Sevres Treaty also 
raised the question of the status of territorial disposition of Syria, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia.”59
The U.S. was represented by three diplomats: Mark Bristol, Richard 
Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy, and Joseph Grew, Ambassador to 
Switzerland. In his diary, Grew confided that the chief obstacles were going to be 
capitulations, financial clauses, and Mosul.60 Child, head of the U.S. delegation, 
talked to the Turkish delegate to discover the Turkish strategy. The Turks 
indicated that they did not want mandates, zones of influence, secret clauses, or 
a territorial home for Armenians or other minorities. The Turks wanted American 
development equal to or exceeding participation of any other nation in the Mosul
59 U.S. High Commission at Constantinople to Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, Department of Commerce 11 February, 1922, RG 151, 7.
60 Joseph Grew Diary, January 3, 1923, an unpublished diary, No. 22, Joseph Grew Papers, 
(Houghton Library, Harvard College Library), 3.
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oil fields. They expressed full willingness to protect American philanthropic, 
educational and religious organizations.61 Throughout the first and second 
conferences, the Turks tried to conclude a separate treaty with the U.S. in order 
to have bargaining chips against Britain and France.62
One of the attendees of the opening ceremony was Benito Mussolini, the 
newly elected Prime Minister of Italy. In his meeting with Child and Grew, 
Mussolini opined that the French and British had different agenda. He thought 
that the Turks were absolutely stubborn and predicted an early break-down of the 
conference.63 Mussolini’s forecast turned out to be true.
The conference began with a welcome speech from Robert Haab, the 
President of the Swiss Confederation. Then Lord Curzon, the Chairman of the 
conference from Britain, made a speech and explained the structure of the 
meeting. No other speeches were planned, but Ismet Pasha, the head of the 
Turkish delegation, arose and made a speech “controversial and threatening in 
tone.” 64 In the speech, Ismet blamed the Western powers for all the misery that 
Near Eastern peoples had to endure 65 Grew looked at Mussolini’s face at that 
moment and Mussolini appeared as if he was about to lunge at Ismet’s throat.66
61 Ibid, November 22, 1922, ibid, 161.
62 Ibid, November 29, 1922, ibid, 175.
63 Grew, November 20, 1922 (unpublished diary), Grew Papers, 154.
64 Ibid.
65 Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft
Terms of Peace, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (London: Majesty’s
Stationary Office, 1923).
66 Grew, November 20, 1922, Diary, Grew Papers, 154.
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Ismet Pasha was not a diplomat. He came to Lausanne because Mustafa 
Kemal trusted him most. Although Ismet was not the ablest negotiator, Mustafa 
Kemal knew him to be neither a Bolshevik nor an Anglophile. In addition to his lack 
of diplomatic skills, Ismet was almost completely deaf. His secretary sat beside 
him and took notes so that Ismet could read them as they were written. That was 
why there was always a delay in the Turkish delegate’s response to the discussed 
issues. The other delegates found this delay nothing but irritating.67 Grew did not 
have a high opinion of Ismet’s intelligence, especially since he was a soldier.68 
Ismet, however, would play a crucial role in the creation of an independent Turkey 
by sometimes playing the role of a clueless deaf man, sometimes a victorious 
general, and sometimes a drinking buddy of Grew and Child.
Early in the conference, Child declared to the Allied diplomats that the U.S. 
was against any type of special privileges in the Near East. This statement, Grew 
described, had “a bombshell effect.” The Allied representatives realized that the 
U.S. was going to press for open access in the region. It was clear to them, 
especially Britain, that the rationale behind this statement was oil.69 Later, 
journalists asked Grew if Child’s speech would be interpreted as the U.S. 
interfering in European affairs, but Grew rejected this idea.70 Child later made a 
speech to the delegates and said that the U.S. was here to protect U.S. interests: 
commercial, humane and financial. In that speech, Child indicated that the U.S. did
67 Ibid, November 24, 1922, ibid, 170.
68 Ibid, February 4, 1923, ibid, 60.
69 Ibid, November 25, 1922, ibid, 171.
70 Ibid.
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not seek “special privilege or favor” -  just an “open door” for all powers in the Near 
East, freedom of the straits and the Black Sea, and the safety of the minority 
populations.71
At a sub-committee meeting, Italian and British delegates spoke in favor of an 
Armenian state in eastern Anatolia on January 6.72 Riza Nur, the second man in 
the Turkish delegation, interrupted the speech and left the committee room. The 
Allied representatives protested against this action of the Turks.73 This was an 
early indication that it was not going to be easy or even possible to formulate any 
concrete plan for minority independence peacefully.74 The Armenian homeland 
issue was not raised again seriously after this stand off. At the other sub 
committee meetings, Turks rejected every Allied attempt to limit the new republic’s 
sovereignty. It became clear that the Allied diplomats could not make a satisfactory 
agreement with the Turks regarding capitulations, debt control, and the status of 
minorities.75
During the conference, the Turkish and the American delegates were friendly 
towards each other. For instance, the Turks gave a dinner party at the hotel in 
which they were staying. Afterwards, Ismet refused to let Grew and Child depart.
71 Ibid, January 31, 1923, ibid, 43.
72 In his telegram to the Turkish Prime Minister three weeks earlier, Ismet indicated that Britain 
and France planned to advocate for an Armenian homeland. Thus, Ismet believed, they wanted 
to use the Armenian state issue as a bargaining chip to keep the Turks in check in their quest for 
Mosul. Bilal N. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari: Turk Diplomatic Belgelerinde Lozan Baris Conferansi, 
Vol. I (Ankara: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1990), 167.
73 Grew, January 6, 1923, Grew Papers, 5.
74 Ibid, 7.
75 Ibid, January 8, 1923, ibid, 7-8.
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All three of them instead went to a private room and Ismet drank so fast that Grew 
was stunned. Grew and Child promised that they would take Ismet to the U.S. and 
show him Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon and the White House if he signed two 
treaties — one with the Allies and one with the U.S.76 The U.S. delegates 
reciprocated by arranging an official dinner for the Turks. The Turks said they were 
happy with the U.S. attitude in general, although they were disappointed by the 
U.S. support for an Armenian national home. They appreciated, however, that the 
U.S. had to take this stand because of the American public’s support for the 
Christian minorities in Turkey.77 It was the Turks’ struggle with Britain for Mosul 
during the conference that brought the countries together.
At the conference, Ismet claimed Mosul for the Turks because it belonged to 
the Ottoman Empire before the Great War and the population of the region 
consisted of Turks and Kurds.78 Lord Curzon countered by pointing out that the 
Turks were now only 12 percent of the population. Curzon further explained that 
Britain gave a promise to the Arab nations to protect their independence; that 
Kurds were not Turks; and they did not want to live under Turkish rule. Mosul 
traded with Aleppo, Syria and Baghdad, not Anatolia. Turkish control of Mosul was 
bad for the security of Iraq. Curzon denied the Turkish allegations that Britain was 
in the region to exploit the oil reserves.79 Curzon said that they recognized the right 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but that the oil should be open to all nations,
76 Ibid, January 18, 1923, ibid, 22.
77 Ibid, January 29, 1923, ibid, 39.
78 Ibid, January 23, 1923, ibid, 28.
79 Ibid, 29.
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and Britain was prepared to send the Mosul case for arbitration to the League of 
Nations. Ismet rejected arbitration and offered a plebiscite instead. Curzon 
countered by saying that a plebiscite was not reliable because the population was 
illiterate. At the same meeting, Child commented that the U.S. appreciated Britain’s 
efforts to keep Mesopotamia open for other nations. He, however, felt it necessary 
to refer to Curzon’s specific mention of the validity of the claims of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company.
Having observed the negotiations between Turkey and Britain over Mosul, the 
U.S. delegate decided to support Turkey’s claim in early January. While the 
conference was taking place, a group of Americans were in negotiations with 
Turkish officials in Angora in order to revitalize the Chester Concessions. When 
obtaining this concession became a strong possibility in early January, the U.S. 
delegate informed Ismet that if his government granted the concession, the U.S. 
would support Turkish claims in Mosul.80 Although the documents under study are 
silent on the Turkish response, the following events indicate that the Turks must 
have accepted this offer. That was why, perhaps, Child indicated in late January 
that Britain did not have the right to claim the Mosul region.81
Almost two months after the conference started, there was no sign of a 
consensus at the sub-committee meetings. Finally, France and Britain agreed to 
give an ultimatum to the Turks. If the Turks did not sign the treaty, the Allied
80 Bilal N. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari, 340.
81 Grew, January 23, 1923, Grew Papers, 31.
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diplomats threatened to leave Lausanne.82 The Turks were in a state of “dazed 
and childish stupidity,” Grew confided in his diary, without the ability to yield or to 
make any constructive suggestions.83 The final day of the conference came on 
February 4, 1923. Bristol, Child and Grew went to the hall that led to Curzon’s 
room where the Allied powers met with Ismet. The hall was packed with diplomats 
and journalists. Ismet appeared at the door, “descending the stairs followed by his 
delegation; he took off his bowler hat, and bowed right and left to the crowd in the 
hall, smiling broadly and left the hotel.”84 The conference was broken without any 
prospect for peace.
Chester Concession Revitalized
On April 9, 1923, in between the two meetings of the Lausanne Conference, 
the Chester Group received a concession from the Turks in the name of the 
Ottoman-American Development Company (OADC).85 The concession included 
road and railway buildings, construction of public utilities, creation of a new capital 
in Ankara, new harbors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and development 
of oil and mineral resources along the lines of the railroad for 99 years. The 
concession included the oil reserves in Mosul as well.86 According to the
82 Ibid, February 3, 1923, ibid, 53.
83 Ibid, February 2, 1923, ibid, 48.
84 Ibid, February 4, 1923, ibid, 56.
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concession, the exclusive railway, mineral and oil concessions covered 20 
kilometers on either side of a 2,400-mile right-of-way, beginning in Angora and 
covering today’s eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq. OADC estimated it would 
spend one billion five hundred million dollars for the entire construction project.87
By granting the Chester Concession, the Turks made progress towards their 
short and long term objectives. In the short term, the Turkish government wanted 
to divide the Allied front by bringing the U.S. to its side. The Turks understood that 
the U.S. would not allow Britain to have exclusive rights in Mosul. The Turks 
decided that they would rather have political authority over Mosul and let the U.S. 
exploit its underground resources than surrender the region entirely to Britain. In 
the long run, Turkey needed money and technical assistance to rebuild its 
destroyed and bankrupt country. In their dealing with Admiral Bristol, the Turks 
showed that they preferred U.S. development and assistance, which would help 
the Turks rid themselves of the European imperialism under which they suffered 
for centuries.88 The Chester Concession railway system was considered vital by 
the Turks for the future defense of the country. In a newspaper interview, Mouhtar 
Bey, chief engineer of the Eastern Railways, who was also the first Turkish 
Ambassador to the U.S. in 1930, indicated that the railways were essential to his 
country’s future 89
87 Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study of Economic Equality 
Before and Since the Establishment of the Mandate System (London: George Allen & Unwin 
LTD., 1930), 146.
88 Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1- 
31 1923, Bristol Papers, 6.
89 RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions. Folders 26-75 
Box 4, Entry 121, Folder: Press, Aksham, April 17, 1923.
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The timing of the concession’s ratification was not a coincidence. Preparing for 
the second meeting at Lausanne, the Turkish government planned to make a final 
push for its Mosul claim. By granting the Chester Concession to the Americans, 
the Turks gambled that this would influence the U.S. to back Turkey in their 
struggle to include Mosul in the new republic. Furthermore, the Turks calculated 
that even if they could not obtain Mosul, they would use the case to score in other 
fields such as getting rid of financial and judicial capitulations. That was why the 
Turkish government compelled the members of the National Assembly to attend a 
Sunday meeting. In this Grand Assembly session, Rauf Bey, the Prime Minister, 
claimed that the Chester Concession would help Turkey militarily and 
economically.90 The Assembly easily secured the ratification of the concession by 
a large majority.
France immediately protested the Chester Concession.91 On April 16, the 
French Ambassador informed the U.S. Department of State that the right to build 
certain railroads in Anatolia before the war had been granted to the French in 
consideration of a loan to the Turks of a billion francs. France had already loaned 
about half the money and had started construction before the war broke out. 
While the French supported the Open Door policy, they considered it inconsistent 
with that principle for one concession to be annulled and another to be granted in
90 Ibid, Ikdam, April 14, 1923.
91 April 21, from the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the American Mission at Lausanne, File: 24 
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43 Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and 
Expositions. International Conference Records U.S. Mission Lausanne Conference Second 
Phase Records. General Records, Apr. -  Aug. 1923, Folders 17-24 Second Committee. Entry 
121 (Hereafter referred to as RG 43).
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its place. He was told that the Department had incomplete information regarding 
the Chester Concession.92 Britain also protested the concession on the ground 
that Mesopotamia was not under Turkish jurisdiction.93
Now that the French and British were hostile to Chester, Bristol believed that 
American prestige required that Chester be given effective support.94 The 
Department of State recognized the ratification of the Chester Concession as a 
triumph of Open Door policy that would prevent the British from claiming the region 
for themselves.95 The Department instructed Joseph Grew, on the day he was to 
depart for Lausanne for the second conference, that the U.S. should aggressively 
support the Chester Concession at the conference.96
The Second Lausanne Conference
On April 21, 1923, Joseph Grew boarded a train in Bern to return to 
Lausanne 97 This time he was hopeful that there would be an end to the Eastern 
Question. His optimism came from the fact that the Allied nations had come to 
realize that they must recognize the complete sovereignty of the new Turkish 
Republic. That was why there was a consensus among them that they were not 
going to seek economic and judicial interference in the new republic’s affairs. Grew
Qp
Department of State to the Lausanne Mission, April 27 ,1923 . RG 43.




97 Grew, April 21, 1923, unpublished diary, Grew Papers, 73.
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predicted that the main focus of the second meeting at Lausanne was going to be 
pre-war concessions.98 Before the conference, the British delegate warned that the 
Turks would try to play one party against the other.99 It was too late, however, as 
the Turkish National Assembly ratified the Chester Concession two weeks before 
the conference, thereby making the U.S. an interested party for the Near Eastern 
oil reserves.
Joseph Grew headed the U.S. mission to the conference; both France and 
Britain were represented by their respective commissioners in Constantinople, 
General Pelle and Horace Rumbold; the Italian delegation was headed by 
Montagna, Minister to Athens; and once again the head Turkish negotiator was 
Ismet Pasha. The U.S. repeated its strategy from the first conference and joined 
the second meeting as observers.100 Grew informed the Allied representatives that 
they were ready to cooperate, but did not intend to involve themselves in the 
negotiations.101 Because the U.S. objective was to have a fair share of the Near 
Eastern oil reserves through the Chester Concessions, Secretary Hughes asked 
Grew to eliminate any obstacle at the conference that would endanger the
98 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the U.S. Embassy in London, June 6, 1923: File: 
London Embassy, Box 1. RG 43.
99 Grew Papers, Diary 1, 1923, May 1.
100 The State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 19,1923, File: 20 American 
Delegation, Box 3. RG 43, 2.
101 From Grew to the Department, April 27, 1923, Lausanne, Folders 26-75 Box 4, RG 43.
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Concessions.102 During the negotiations, the U.S. remained the only power that 
rejected the Allied concession requests.103
Turkey’s goal was to terminate the capitulations, remove the Ottoman debts, 
and take back Mosul. The Turks broke the negotiations once before and they 
would not have hesitated to break it again even, if it resulted in war in order, not to 
give any judicial or political rights to foreign nations. Ismet was adamant that 
capitulations had been abolished after September 1914 when the Ottoman Empire 
had entered the Great War and sent a note to all capitulatory powers that 
capitulations were no longer tolerated by the Ottoman Empire.104 Ismet 
established that foreigners in the country could continue to live and do business, 
but they were bound to the new Turkish laws.105
On April 22, Ismet proposed to Grew that the two countries strengthen their 
economic relations, not only by concluding a treaty but also with economic 
concessions. After all, the Turks showed their good faith by granting the Chester 
Concession. He stated categorically to Grew that no step that he might take at 
Lausanne would in any manner prejudice valid U.S. rights.106 Ismet mentioned that 
General Pelle planned to bring up the Chester Concession at the conference, and 
he asked what the U.S. response Would be. Grew simply indicated that the U.S.
102 From the State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 19, Box 3, File: 20 American 
Delegation, RG 43, 6.
103 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, July 7, Box 3, File: 24 
Concession 2 of 2, RG 43.
104 From Grew to the Department of State, April 27, 1923: Box 1, File: 9A, 1 of 5, RG 43.
105 From Grew to the Department of State, May 1, 1923, ibid.
106 Lausanne, July 8, 1923, RG 43, Box 4.
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always protected its legitimate rights.107 Grew understood that the Turks would 
not accept the most-favored nation clause, and would demand reciprocity from 
the United States.108 The Turks pointed out that they considered the Treaty of 
1830 to be abrogated and that there were no consular conventions drawn up 
since the abolition of the capitulations. Therefore, they wanted to negotiate a 
separate convention. According to the Turks, all pre-war treaties were 
capitulatory; the capitulations were abolished; therefore, the pre-war treaties 
were abolished.109
After the conclusion of the first Lausanne Conference, France no longer had 
any territorial ambitions in the Near East. The primary French goal was to recover 
some of the pre-war investments in the Near East. In that regard, General Pelle 
informed Grew that the Chester Concession touched French interests in the 
Samsun-Sivas railway on the Black Sea region and the development of the port of 
Samsun.110 Pelle further explained that France had negotiated for the Samsun- 
Sivas railway with the Ottoman officials in Paris and Constantinople in 1914 and 
provided for a French loan of eight hundred million francs for the Ottoman 
government.111 These agreements were confirmed by an Imperial law on April 8, 
1914. The Ottoman parliament approved it in June and the Parliament passed a
107 Grew, April 22, 1923, Diary, 77.
108 Grew to Bristol, May 17, 1923, RG 43, Box 4, Folder 31, 2.
109 Ibid, May 17, 1923, 1, (Separate letter from ibid).
110 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, May 29, 1923, File: 24 
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43, 1
111 Ibid.
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law confirming the loan on July 14 ,1914.112 France paid an advance of five 
hundred million francs and started building the railway. Three weeks later work 
stopped due to the outbreak of war between France and Germany.113 In February 
1922 Hamid Bey, the representative in Constantinople of the Grand National 
Assembly, gave General Pelle assurances that the French pre-war concessions 
would be respected. Pelle informed Grew that the French government did not wish 
to interfere with the Chester Concession but that it would demand compensation in 
some other form.114 Later in the conference, Grew urged Ismet to compensate the 
French company; because Grew was involved, Ismet guaranteed compensation to 
France.115
The head Italian delegate, Montagna, expressed hope that Italy and the United 
States might work together in the Near East. He believed that in contrast to 
France, Italy, with an increasing birth-rate and vigorous laboring population, must 
have room for expansion. That Italy looked toward infiltration of Asia Minor was no 
secret. When Grew told him that beyond equal economic opportunity the U.S. had 
no political interest in Turkey, he answered that political influence naturally 
followed economic influence and that in 25 years, more or less, when the new 




115 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24, 
Concession (1 of 2), Box 3. RG 43, 5.
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said Italy was politically weak but she was militarily, sociologically and 
philosophically strong.
Britain wanted mandates over Mosul and Palestine, as well as a safe 
evacuation of Constantinople.116 During the negotiations, the British delegate used 
other matters -  judicial and economic concessions and war reparations -  as 
bargaining chips in order to control the oil fields. Early in the conference, the 
matter of concessions was taken up in informal conversation between Ismet and 
the European Allies. These delegates requested that concessions signed before 
August 1, 1914 be confirmed as well as concessions for which the regularization 
had begun but not been completed before August 1, 1914.117 This would be a 
blow for the Chester Concession as the request would validate the Turkish 
Petroleum Company’s claims in the region. Feeling the pressure, Ismet asked 
Grew to make presentations on this subject to the Allied delegates.118
Ismet visited Grew on June 6. He complained that the other Allied delegates 
were forcing him to sign a treaty confirming pre-war concessions that were not 
legally valid.119 He warned Grew that this move was specifically directed against 
the Chester Concession and that he might be forced to yield in the interest of 
peace. When Ismet asked for Grew’s opinion, Grew said that Turkey had fought
116 From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 5, 1923, File: 24 
Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43.
117 Grew to Bristol, June 5, 1923, RG 43, 1.
118 Grew to Bristol, May 17, 1923, Box 4, Folder 31 RG 43, 1.
119 American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24, Concession 
(1 of 2), p. 1. Box 3. RG 43.
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for its sovereignty and should not yield on such an important question.120 When 
Ismet asked about the U.S. response if the Turks should yield, Grew declared that 
the U.S. would not accept the principle of legalization of pre-war concessions.121 In 
other words, the U.S. was not going to leave Mosul to the British. Receiving the 
exact response he sought, Ismet kissed Grew on both cheeks. The Turks now had 
the Americans behind them, which would make it more difficult for the British and 
French to push the Turks around at the conference.
After long negotiations, the Turks and the British agreed to settle the Mosul 
boundary issue within nine months after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. If it 
was not settled by then, it would be referred to the League of Nations.122 Grew 
proudly informed the State Department that there was not going to be any 
mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company nor any prior or future concessions 
in the treaty. The U.S. mission successfully eliminated from the treaty all of the 
objectionable provisions relating to concessions.123
After Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty with the European Allies, the U.S. 
signed a separate treaty with Turkey, which established equal relations between 
the two countries. The U.S. achieved its two primary goals at the conference: 
preventing Britain from extending its sphere of influence in the Near East and 
continuing the Chester Concession. While the U.S.’s 1920’s foreign policy 
mentality dictated an aggressive Open Door policy, the Turkish receptiveness
120 ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Grew to the Department of State, June 26, 1923, File: 9A, (1 of 5), Box 1, RG 43.
123 Grew to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, July 18, 1923, File: Paris Embassy, Box 1, RG 43.
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towards American capital in the region was instrumental to accomplishing this 
mission. By granting the Chester Concession to the U.S. at just the right time, the 
Turks caused tension between the Allies and the U.S. In the end, Britain 
recognized in principle American interests in the region. Although the Turks 
ultimately failed to assert their control over Mosul, the issue helped them to end 
the Allied occupation of Asia Minor and create a fully independent state.
After he replaced Woodrow Wilson and became President in 1921, Warren 
Harding reintroduced Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy policies as the foundation 
of U.S. foreign policy his administration. This was the driving force behind the U.S. 
delegation during the Lausanne negotiations. For the many Americans who 
believed in Wilson’s idealism, however, an Open Door policy was tasteless and 
contradicted U.S. national values. From its signing until its rejection in the Senate 
in early 1927, the American public engaged in an intense dispute regarding the 
ratification of the Treaty.
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CHAPTER III
AMERICAN PUBLIC’S REACTION TO THE LAUSANNE TREATY
With the Lausanne Treaty, the U.S. government agreed for the first time to 
have diplomatic relations with a predominantly Muslim nation based on the 
principles of equality and reciprocity. Yet a broad cross-section of the American 
people considered the Turks to be culturally, religiously and ethnically inferior. 
They believed that a treaty with the Turks was pointless because the Turks would 
not recognize international rules and regulations. This common perception of the 
Turks was based on broadly accepted stereotypes that were reinforced in the 
media.1 For example, Turks were routinely depicted as ugly and uncivilized, 
particularly the Turkish men who were living a hedonistic life style in their harems 
filled with Christian girls. This stereotypical view of the Turks was reinforced by the 
news of Turkish atrocities against Armenians during the Great War in 1914 and 
1915.2
1 For some Turkish depictions in U.S. media, refer to these cartoons, “Turkey Must Remain in 
Europe” Literary Digest, April 3 1920 Vol. 65 No. 1, 25. “The Unspeakable Turk” Literary Digest, 
December 18, 1920 Vol. 67 No. 12, 15. “Uncorked by the W ar” Literary Digest, May 6, 1922 Vol. 
73 No. 6, 23. “It Ain’t Polite to Interrupt” Literary Digest, June 17, 1922 Vol. 73 No. 12, 11.
2 The Ottoman Empire’s handling of the Armenian independence movement in Anatolia in 1914 
and 1915 is a cause of a serious disagreement between historians who called the event as 
“Genocide” and those who claimed that it was a “civil war.” There is a consensus among many 
European and North American historians that the Ottoman government systematically 
exterminated close to one million Armenian civilians. A group of mostly Turkish historians, on the 
other hand, claim that what happened was a civil war among Turks, Kurds and Armenians which 
resulted in many casualties and death on all sides. During the research at the Manuscript Division 
of the Library of Congress in Washington DC, I came across several eye witness accounts that 
support the “Genocide” interpretation.
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The Treaty with Turkey was no longer a matter of recognizing a relatively 
obscure country, but a matter of protecting American purity and honor by 
abstaining from relations with Turkey. It was just as important to assist and protect 
Christians under their rule. The opposition to the treaty created an ideological 
language that was communicated through race, gender and religious codes. This 
ideological language, originated from the Turks’ massacres of the Armenians 
during the Great War, strengthened the popular anti-Turkish view that was the 
basis for the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty in January 1927. Some opponents 
fused these religious and racial arguments with anti-business interests in support 
of their moralistic approach to U.S. foreign policy
The Opposition to the Treaty
Opponents of the Treaty founded committees, mobilized churches, and sent 
individual petitions to their elected officials and policy makers to try and change 
U.S. Open Door policy, as well as to assist and protect the Christian population in 
Turkey. The anti-Lausanne discourse galvanized the Democratic Party leadership 
ideologically and provided it with a broad-based, popular issue with which to 
oppose the Republican administration. The anti- Lausanne movement also 
demonstrated the impact of religion, racial prejudice and gender roles in U.S. 
foreign policy making. Immediately after its signature, the Lausanne Treaty 
became the next chapter in the struggle between Christianity and Islam. This 
Crusading mentality was channeled towards inspiring manly Americans to save 
innocent Christian women and girls from Turkish savages.
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By sending separate notes to the President, the State Department and 
individual Senators immediately after the signing of the Treaty, the Congregational 
Ministers of Idaho registered their concerns about potential future massacres of 
Christians by Turks.1 The ministers’ petition claimed that Muslim Turks, by 
inheritance and religion, were incapable of treating Christians humanely.2 They 
pleaded with the U.S. government to apply the “sternest justice for the past and 
most rigid restrictions for the future.”3 Another group of Baptist ministers declared 
that the U.S. needed to go to war against the infidel Turks in order to save the 
Armenians.4
In a petition to U.S. Senators, one hundred and ten Episcopalian bishops, led 
by Bishop William Manning of New York, claimed that Christian sentiment in the 
U.S. was strongly against such a treaty with an “anti-Christian government” that 
killed one million innocent Christian men, women and children, and was holding 
tens of thousands of Christian women and children in harems.5 These Bishops 
claimed that it was the U.S.’s moral obligation to help Christian Armenians.6
1 From Idaho Congregational Conference to Borah, March 10, 1920. Boise, Idaho. Box 83, File: 
1919-20 Foreign Affairs, William Borah Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington DC) hereafter, Borah Papers.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign 
Policy (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964), 203.
5 A Protest to the Honorable Claude A. Swanson: Against Ratification by the Senate of the 
Lausanne Treaty Negotiated Between the United States and Turkey at Lausanne on August 6, 
1923, by One Hundred and Ten Bishops. Publication time and place is unknown, however, it 
appears that this pamphlet was published some time during the second half of 1926. Found at 
Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington DC, 1.
6 Ibid, 2.
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Bishops from the Northern Baptist Church, Methodist Episcopal Church 
South, Reformed Church, and Episcopalian Church denounced the treaty in a 
letter to the Senate immediately preceding the vote on the Treaty. These bishops 
wrote that the Treaty ignored the U.S.’s moral obligations towards Armenians 
and broke Wilson’s promise to give them an independent homeland. They 
argued that the treaty condoned massacres of Armenians and abandoned 
“untold thousands of Christian girls now in Moslem hands to their fate.” According 
to these bishops, only big businesses supported the treaty. The letter concluded 
that the Treaty would be a dishonor to the U.S. and Christian churches.7
In addition to organized church opposition, there were other committees 
established against the Treaty. One of them was the American Committee for the 
Independence of Armenia (ACIA). According to the ACIA, the Turks made an 
alliance with the U.S. State Department in return for their support of an Open Door 
policy in the Near East.8 The ACIA described it as “dishonorable” that the Chester 
Concessions determined the U.S. government’s position at Lausanne.9 In an ACIA 
pamphlet, the Turks were portrayed as the “most primitive and backward branch 
of the Mongolian race.”10 Turks were also characterized as a mixture of races,
7 January 8, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG .1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, Sess.2, 
microfilm No. 174, 1266.
8 “Kemalist Turkey,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924, 48. Found at 
Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.
9 “The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey,” by American Committee for the Independence of 
Armenia, New York: 1924, ibid, 13.
10 Charles H. Kirby, “The Turks,” ibid, 48.
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including black slaves of Sudan and Central Africa, and as a result they 
represented a “lower type” of people.11
A member of the ACIA, James W. Gerard, former U.S. Ambassador to 
Germany, accused Secretary Hughes of lying about the connection between U.S. 
policy at the Lausanne Conference and the Chester Concession.12 Gerard also 
accused Hughes of changing his opinion about Armenians after he became the 
Secretary of State. He accurately noted that Hughes supported Armenian 
independence in 1919.13 He also pointed out that Turkish and American 
representatives at Lausanne worked together to abolish capitulations and resolve 
the Armenian issue in Turkey’s favor. In return, the Turks accepted the U.S. Open 
Door policy as the basis for foreign relations.14 In the Chester Concession case, 
Gerard accused the Department of State of reverting “to the old and discredited 
policy of Dollar Diplomacy.”15 He concluded that American honor depended upon 
keeping its promise for an independent Armenia.16
Historian Merlo Pusey, biographer of Charles Hughes, wrote that Hughes had 
been an active member of the Armenian Committee for the Independence of 
Armenia before he became the Secretary of State. Early in 1919 Hughes 
advocated for American protection of Armenians. Turkish atrocities against this
11 Ibid, 48-49.
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Christian minority during the war aroused U.S. public opinion, and Hughes at the 
time supported U.S. intervention on Armenia’s behalf while the troops were 
already in Europe.17 Once he became Secretary of State, however, Hughes 
believed that the possibility of intervention no longer existed. He concluded that 
most of the U.S. troops had left Europe, the Turks were prepared to fight to protect 
their territorial integrity, and the U.S. public would never support sending soldiers 
to die in Turkey. Pusey explained that when the Lausanne Conference opened, 
Hughes’ inability to protect the rights of the persecuted and decimated Armenians 
in Turkey left him in an embarrassing position. Pusey claimed that the anti- 
Lausanne people never forgave Hughes for abandoning the Armenians’ fate to the 
Turks.18
Another domestic committee active in this debate was the American 
Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT). In one of their 1926 
publications, ACOLT asserted that the Treaty was against “the spirit of Christianity” 
as well as “the ideals of America.”19 According to ACOLT, the treaty defied 
Wilson’s promise for an independent Armenia. ACOLT claimed that the Treaty was 
an approval of a government “founded upon murder, rape and rapine;” it sullied 
American honor; undermined U.S. obligation to Armenia; was “un-American” and
17 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 
574.
18 Ibid.
19 The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in New York. Publication 
place and date is unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in New York City 
some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, 
Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41.
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un-Christian.”20 According to Ernest Riggs, an ACOLT member and previous 
missionary in Asia Minor, Wilson’s acceptance of an Armenian homeland agitated 
the Turks, increased their hostility, and contributed to Turkish violence against the 
Armenians directly. This explains why the U.S. had a moral obligation to protect 
the Armenians 21
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. (1856-1946) was a leader in the opposition 
movement. As an admirer of Woodrow Wilson, Morgenthau was a strong believer 
in American moral superiority over other nations. This superiority, according to 
him, brought moral responsibilities.22 He believed that most of the nations of the 
world were immoral, but the U.S. was unique and should therefore demonstrate 
that it was an ethical and peaceful nation through its policies and actions. Then, 
the U.S. can “sit in judgment upon international disputes” and resolve international 
conflicts fairly.23 One of the responsibilities of the U.S., he asserted, was to deal 
with the Turks. During his tenure as Ambassador in the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I, Morgenthau Sr. witnessed the extermination of Armenians. When the 
U.S. entered the Great War, he returned to the U.S. and became an ardent 
advocate of an Armenian state.
20 Ibid, 5.
21 The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in New York, “A Missionary 
on the Lausanne Treaty,” signed by Ernest W . Riggs (March 1926), ibid.
22 Henry Morgenthau, “America’s Moral Responsibility to the World”Speech at the Church of 
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The greatest opponent of the Treaty in the Senate was William King, a 
Democrat from Utah. According to King, the Lausanne Treaty was opposed by 
Democratic senators upon these grounds: “It failed to provide for the fulfillment of 
the Wilson award to Armenia, guaranteeing protection of Christians and non- 
Moslems in Turkey, and recognition by Turkey of American nationality of former 
subjects of Turkey... American commerce with Turkey-actual and potential -  is a 
trifling matter of but a few millions of dollars annually and needs no serious 
consideration.”24 After traveling in Turkey and Russia in 1925, King concluded that 
the U.S. should recognize the Bolsheviks before the Turks.25
King additionally drafted legislation to bring this issue before the Senate. In 
June 3, 1924, for example, he introduced a resolution that charged the Treaty with 
betraying the Armenians. The Resolution also invited the Senate to investigate the 
relationship between the Chester Concession and the Treaty 26 A month before 
the Senate vote, King introduced another resolution reminding his colleagues of 
Wilson’s promise to the Armenians and highlighting the relationship between the 
Open Door policy and the Chester Concessions.27 King correctly perceived that
24 Why the Democrats Defeated the Turkish Treaty, The Literary Digest for January 29, 1927. Box 
91, Notebook-News Clippings, Bristol Papers, 10.
25 The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, based in New York, “Senator 
King’s Reply,” signed by William H. King (March 9, 1926), 14. Publication place and date is 
unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in New York City some time during 
the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41, 
Conts. 40-41. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
26 Congressional Record Vol. 65, PT.10-11, PG.9583-11,367, 1924 Cong.68, Sess. 1, microfilm 
No. 166, 10292.
27 Res. 306. December 22, 1926, Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG .1-3482, 1926-27 
Cong.69, Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 910-911.
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the Turks granted the Chester Concessions in order to secure the moral and 
diplomatic support of the U.S. delegation in Lausanne.28
The Lausanne Treaty had its outspoken detractors in the most prestigious 
universities. Even among scholars, racist and bigoted language was employed to 
defeat the treaty. Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor of government at Harvard 
University, was wrote many articles condemning U.S. foreign policy in the Near 
East and criticizing the Treaty. Hart claimed that the U.S. government ignored 
public opinion when negotiating the Treaty.29 According to Hart, the Treaty 
assumed that the Turks were a civilized people who would honor their promises. 
Hart claimed that the Turks were of Asiatic stock and had been a “dreadful curse” 
to Europe for six hundred years.30 As a barbaric nation, they first destroyed the 
Byzantium Empire and enslaved Christians who were “superior to them in culture.” 
He characterized the Turks as far more alien to the European culture than the 
Chinese and Japanese people.31 Hart believed that the Turks were incapable of 
excelling in literature or business; they knew only how to fight.32
Hart conceded that the educated Turk was “delightful” and loved “dogs, 
children and wives and flowers and nature; but at heart he is still a Mongol
28 Ibid, 911.
29 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist 
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Tartar.”33 He wondered: if the Negroes in the U.S. revolted, seized power, and 
reduced the white race into bondage, would other nations make treaties with this 
new country?34 He claimed that as long as the Turks controlled the western side of 
the Bosporus, there could not be a treaty as they were an unreliable nation that 
could not be trusted to protect their Christian population35 He explained that 
Britain and France signed treaties with Turkey because they had financial interests 
in the region, but that the American people were opposed to this type of 
commercial diplomacy.36
Hart believed that as an Asiatic race the Turks were unfit to be a civilized 
nation and that was why the U.S. should not associate with them.37 Exhibiting a 
complete disregard to the realities of African Americans in the U.S., he further 
claimed that the new Turkish regime was racist because of their treatment of the 
minorities and he labeled them the Ku Klux Klan of the Near East.38 According to 
Hart, President Wilson did not recognize the Huerta government that was “founded 
upon force” in Mexico; he then asked why the U.S. should have relations with the
o o
Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” 11.
34 Ibid.
35 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” Forum, December 1924, Vol. 
LXXII, No. 6, p. 735.
36 Ibid.
37 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Reservations as to the Eastern Question,” Annals of the Academics of 
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Turks “who are below the level of Mexicans in moral fiber and no higher in self- 
government?”39
An influential publication at this time was Kemal’s Slave Market and the
Lausanne Treaty.40 According to this document, there were between 100,000 -
400,000 Christian girls in Turkish harems. Christian girls of 14 years of age were
taken into Turkish harems and younger girls were “farmed out to Arabs and
Kurds” until they grew up.41 It also indicated that thousands of women killed
themselves rather than marry Moslem men, causing a disgrace to Christianity.
This piece stated that the
multitude of white Christian women, girls and children, [were] helpless in 
the hands of Moslem owners-unable to escape from Moslem bondage- 
subject to foul indignity and bestial brutality. We think of young white 
children who are being farmed until they reach the age of 14 who are for 
sale. We think of the appalling fact that the Anglo Saxon race of Britain 
and America stands by and sees these things. We think of girls as 
educated and refined as any that can be found in Britain or America 
forced to be wives of Moslems -  forced oftentimes by beating and 
threats of death to repeat the Moslem formula before the Mullah. 
Christian girls are waiting to be rescued.42
Other opponents to the Treaty included A.D.F. Hamlin, Dean of the School of 
Architecture at Columbia University, who postulated that the U.S. signed the 
Treaty because the U.S. was too cowardly to consider an armed conflict with the
3Q Albert Bushnell Hart. “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” 738.
40 Publisher and publication time is unknown. This document is available at The Papers of Henry 
Morgenthau Sr. Conts. 40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41.
41 Kemal’s Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty, The Papers of Henry Morgenthau Sr. Conts. 
40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41, 2.
42 Ibid, 7-8.
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Turks.43 He characterized the Lausanne Treaty as a sign of “infamy, a piece of 
national cowardice, and a symptom of moral bankruptcy.”44 Oscar Solomon Straus 
objected to the Lausanne Treaty because it abolished the capitulations and 
entangled the U.S. in European affairs 45 Straus was convinced Turks were not 
civilized enough to have a Western type of judicial system, and that placing 
Americans under Turkish rule was dangerous.46 Wilfred M. Post, who worked in 
Turkey as a medical missionary for 21 years, criticized the Treaty in his 1926 
pamphlet47 that claimed the U.S. government placed American institutions in 
Turkey under Turkish law with the abandonment of capitulations 48 Wilfred 
reminded readers that this was the government that murdered thousands of 
Armenians and destroyed Smyrna.49 He concluded that the Treaty was “one sided, 
unsatisfactory, humiliating and dishonorable.”50 James Paulos, a chocolate shop 
owner from Minnesota, on behalf of seven hundred thousand Greek citizens of the 
U.S., ten thousand Greek citizens of Montana and seven thousand Greek ex­
43 A.D.F. Hamlin, “A Treaty of Surrender,” in The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New 
York, 1924, p. 31. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.
44 Ibid.
45 Oscar Solomon Straus, “Objections to the Lausanne Treaty,” in The Lausanne Treaty and 
Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924, p. 46. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 
41, Conts. 38-39. Although he did not explain why the Treaty would cause an entanglement in 
European affairs, the Chester Concession would have been the major reason of his belief.
46 Ibid, 47.
47 Wilfred M. Post, “An Indefensible and Humiliating Treaty” Publication place and date is 
unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published some time during the second half of 
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servicemen who served during the war urged Senator Thomas Walsh, member of 
the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, to reject the treaty.51
Some evoked the Crusades to advocate for military intervention. On July 24, 
1922, Hughes informed Harding of his conversation with Bishop Cannon of the 
Methodist Church. The Methodist Church adopted a resolution that said the U.S. 
government should take all necessary steps to help the Christians in Turkey, 
including sending soldiers. 52 The Reverend Alfred Harding of the Protestant 
Episcopalian Church of Washington sent a note to Hughes and requested that 
the U.S. make every effort — diplomatic, naval or military — that would help the 
Christians.53
For some Americans the Lausanne Treaty symbolized an Islamic victory over 
Christianity, and their editorials and public rhetoric drew upon the Crusades 
metaphor to fuel public resentment and incite action. A few days before the Senate 
vote in early 1927, the New York Times editorialized that the rejection of the Treaty 
would be akin to the Battle of Tours between the Frankish Army and the Al- 
Andalus Empire of Spain in 732 A.D. According to the editorial, just as the Battle 
Tours closed the doors of Europe to the spread of Islam, the rejection of the Treaty 
would represent another Christian victory over Islam.54 The editor emphasized that
51 James P. Paulson to Thomas J. Walsh, October 8, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. 
Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
52 Hughes to President Harding, July 24, 1922. FRUS 1922, Vol. 2, United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 931.
53 Bishop Alfred Harding to Hughes, September 22, 1922. FRUS 1922, Vol. 2, United States 
Government Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 938.
54 New York Times, January 15 1927, “Hammering Islam,” 14.
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under the pending Treaty, Turks could come to the U.S. to convert Christians and 
Jews to Islam.55 The writer warned the readers that if the Treaty was ratified, the 
call of the muezzin would be heard from the roofs of synagogues and churches.
Before the vote on the Treaty, Duncan Upshaw Fletcher (1859-1936), 
Democratic Senator from Florida, made a dramatic speech on the floor of the 
Senate that implored the members to vote against the Treaty. Fletcher began by 
saying that it was an insult to the honor and values of the U.S. to ratify the Treaty 
because it would legitimize a thousand years of Turkish barbarism. Fletcher 
characterized the Treaty as condoning wholesale murder, rape, pillage and every 
other kind of shameless infamy of the Turks. He exclaimed that for hundreds of 
years it was Christendom’s goal to drive back the barbarian hordes of Turkey out 
of Europe and put an end to their rule over Christians. He continued that Turkish 
brutality was sustained through the Great War and their independence war, and 
Treaty supporters asked the U.S. to condone acts of outrage and violence 
against white Christian women. Upshaw also connected the Treaty to Dollar 
Diplomacy and big businesses’ voracious and unchecked grab for power, 
resources and money, “which left out all morality in foreign policy.” He accused 
the industrialists of uniting U.S. interests with the evil, infamous Turks. Big 
business, he warned, wanted the U.S. to ratify the Treaty while thousands of 
Christian girls remained enslaved in Turkish harems.56
55 Ibid.
56 January 18, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG .1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, 
Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 1881.
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Support for the Ratification
The opposition was wide-spread and prevented the Senate from achieving 
support in sufficient numbers to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. There were, however, 
outspoken advocates of establishing relations with Turkey in religious and 
education institutions. The Congregational Churches of the U.S. and its foreign 
missionary society, The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 
were strong supporters of the treaty. On April 12, 1926 the Commission on Foreign 
Relations of the National Council of the Congregational Churches unanimously 
decided to support the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.57 Less than a month 
before the ratification came to the Senate floor, the Congregational Church sent 
separate letters to Frank Kellogg, the new Secretary of State, William Borah, the 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and President 
Coolidge.58 In these letters, the Congregational Church argued that the Lausanne 
Treaty would actually protect the American missionary, educational and 
philanthropic interests in Turkey that were over a century old. The letter further 
explained that Armenians would have the fullest protection only with the Treaty 
and the subsequent official presence of the American government through an 
embassy.
The First Congregational Church actively sought the support of the policy 
makers to ratify the Treaty. In a June 1926 letter to Senator Thomas Walsh, the
57 The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, December 20,
1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
58 The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, December 20,
1926, ibid.
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Church explained that they had invested millions of dollars in Turkey and they had 
a substantial number of missionaries and teachers in the field.59 The letter assured 
Walsh that the treaty should be ratified for both the well-being of the American 
interests in Turkey and the development of this new state.60
Charles Henry Brent (1862-1929), Episcopal bishop of Western New York, was 
one of the most prominent religious leaders who at first opposed the Treaty, but 
later changed his mind and supported it. He was originally a member of the one 
hundred and ten Bishops who opposed the Treaty and an executive committee 
member of The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT). 
Bishop Brent was also a contributor to anti-Treaty publications.61 Over the course 
of a few years, however, he gradually changed his position and became a 
supporter of the Treaty.
In September 1926 Brent explained why he retracted his opposition. In a letter 
to Secretary Kellogg, Brent wrote that he wanted to dissociate himself from the 
extremely prejudiced, inconsistent, and inaccurate statements about Mustapha 
Kemal and the 100,000 women said to be in Turkish harems. He knew that the 
accusations in the Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty were untrue 62 He
59 The First Congregational Church to Thomas J. Walsh, June 8, 1926, ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 In The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, New York, 1924. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. 
Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39, 12.
62 Bishop Brent’s Answer to the Editorial Entitled “As Seen by Two Bishops” in “The Living 
Church” of August 14, 1926., September 3, 1926. Box 30, File: Prayer Notes Etc, personal copy, 
Charles Brent Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 2.
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stated, “It is easier to be consistent than honest.”63 He meant that maintaining the 
same opinion would have been the path of least resistance, but it would have been 
dishonest when his thoughtfulness and intellectual inquiry had taken him down a 
different road. Brent was also influenced by a list of over one hundred Americans 
in Constantinople urging Kellogg to ratify the Treaty. The signers represented 
every type of American activities in Turkey, including colleges, schools, and 
missionary and philanthropic organizations.64
Brent clarified his point further by drawing a domestic parallel, stating that the 
U.S. was guilty of the crime of lynching, yet Congress refused to pass an anti- 
lynching bill, “so that this nation stands before God and the world as guilty as hell 
of every lynching that happens.”65 He pointed out that Americans condemned the 
Turks for their history, but wondered what Americans would think if other nations 
would refuse a treaty with the U.S. because of its dishonorable history of slavery 
and continued treatment of Blacks.66 Brent confessed that ever since he read 
John Jay Chapman’s (1862 -  1933) accusation that every American citizen was 
guilty of lynching, he felt pain in his soul whenever he heard about a lynching 
case.67 While the U.S. was condemning the Turks for barbarous behavior, Brent 





67 In 1912, Chapman held a memorial service for a lynched black Pennsylvania man on the first 
anniversary. His dramatic speech in the service appeared in Harper's Weekly (September 21, 
1912). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved March 2, 2007, from Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Online: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9022484.
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refused to condemn this horrendous crime. He asked the American public what 
they would say if a foreign country refused to ratify a treaty, because Americans 
practiced and condoned the lynching of its own people, failing to protect the 
rights and lives of their own minority population.68
Just as there were Ivy League academics opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, 
there were also advocates in favor of its ratification. Edward Meade Earle of 
Columbia University claimed that the ratification of the treaty would be simply 
recognition of a fait accompli. Like Bishop Brent, he reminded Americans that 
Americans should not apply different standards to other nations than what they 
apply to themselves.69 In an article that he published in Forum, he pointed out that 
the U.S. criticized Turkey for ill-treatment of its minorities. Earle then asked his 
readers to consider the Negroes who did not enjoy any protection from courts in 
the south, and to remember the judicial injustice against the Japanese on the 
Pacific Coast.70 He concluded by claiming that the Turks were no better or worse 
than other nations of the Near East, and the U.S. could not continue persisting with 
moralistic judgments and dictating terms to other sovereign nations that it labeled 
as criminal.71 Earle asserted that the U.S. needed to accept the present terms of 
the Treaty because it did nothing between 1917 and 1923 that could have laid the
go
Bishop Brent’s Answer to the Editorial Entitled “As Seen by Two Bishops” in “The Living 
Church” of August 14,1926., September 3, 1926. Box 30, File: Prayer Notes Etc, personal copy, 
Brent Papers, 11.
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foundation for a different and more satisfactory treaty than Lausanne.72 He claimed 
that during this time period the U.S. never declared war on Turkey; President 
Wilson approved the landing of Greek army in Asia Minor; the U.S. did not 
participate in the making of the Sevres Treaty; and finally the U.S. Senate did not 
accept a mandate over Armenia in 1920.73
There were other scholars who supported the Treaty. For example, the 
president of Mount Holyoke College, Mary E. Woolley, urged Senator Thomas 
Walsh to ratify the treaty.74 The rejection, according to her, would cause Turkish 
hostility to American educational and religious institutions in Turkey.75 Paul D. 
Moodey, the president of Middlebury College, also was one of the supporters of 
the treaty. In his letter to Thomas Walsh, he mentioned that people who lived in 
the Near East and knew the conditions supported the treaty.76 He asserted that 
the reaction against the treaty generated “more heat than light” and urged Walsh 
to vote favorably for the treaty.77 Finally, the business interests appealed to policy 
makers for the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. The Brooklyn Chamber of 
Commerce, for instance, in a letter to Thomas J. Walsh explained that American
72 Edward Meade Earle, the speech at the 68th Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign Policy 
Association, Astor Place, New York. The transcript of the meeting was published as The 
Lausanne Treaty: Should the United States Ratify it?, Foreign Policy Association Pamphlets, No. 
26: Series of 1923-24: New York, 1924, 8.
73 Ibid, 8-9.
74 Mary E. Woolley to Thomas J. Walsh, December 4, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. 
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trade with Turkey and the Near East was handicapped because there was not a 
treaty specifying relations between the U.S. and Turkey.78
The Lausanne Treaty Survives
Although the majority voted for it 54-30, the Senate did not have the two-thirds 
majority required to ratify the Treaty. Afterwards, the strong anti-Turkish 
movement gradually lost momentum due to the American people’s weariness of 
international affairs and their desire to address the ills of their own society rather 
than criticizing the Turks. Ironically, the ideological platform based on race and 
religion became a major factor in the Coolidge administration’s ability to 
reestablish the Lausanne Treaty. During the winter of 1926 when the opposition 
was at its peak, some opponents of the Treaty began to realize that the anti- 
Treaty movement devolved into mostly propaganda and was no longer a debate 
about U.S. policy.
Some of the previously adamant opponents switched sides to support the 
Treaty and turned the arrows of criticism onto social injustice issues in American 
society. This explains why the movement lacked the ability to mobilize again 
when President Coolidge disregarded the Senate’s decision and activated the 
Treaty with the Turks in February 1927. By sending Mark Bristol to Angora, the 
U.S. de facto recognized the Turkish nationalist government and agreed to work 
with them by the terms agreed to in Lausanne. In the end, both the U.S. and 
Turkey lost a valuable opportunity to improve their policies. An impartial criticism
78 Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce to Thomas J. Walsh, December 30, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh 
and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.
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of the Lausanne Treaty may have launched a reasoned debate on U.S. values in 
its foreign policy. It may also have pushed the new Turkish Republic to be more 
considerate with its minority rights, as a way to lessen U.S. concerns.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. negotiated the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which established equal 
diplomatic relations between the two countries on the basis of the Open Door 
policy. The U.S. policy makers’ main objective during the Lausanne Conference 
was to protect the recent privately-received Chester Concessions. The Chester 
Concessions exemplified the increasing significance of Near Eastern underground 
resources to big businesses and policy makers in industrialized countries. The 
Turkish National Assembly confirmed the Chester Concessions shortly before the 
assembly of the second Lausanne Conference'in April 1923 in order to pave the 
way for U.S. support of Turkish claims against Britain and France during the 
conference. Although this calculated move did not place Mosul within Turkish 
borders — one of Turkey’s expressed objectives — the U.S. support of the Turks 
against British and French pressure fulfilled another Turkish interest of breaking 
Western European imperial claims on Turkish sovereign territory. It can be 
postulated that the Turks successfully manipulated the U.S., using Open Door 
policy, to prevent Britain and France from imposing what would have been a 
disadvantageous treaty from the Turkish perspective.
The Lausanne Treaty, however, met with an unexpected reaction by the 
American public. Many Americans from different segments of the society found the 
Treaty intolerable and humiliating. Two factors contributed to this reaction: the 
Armenian situation and the preconceived prejudices against Muslims and Turks. 
During the Great War, the Ottoman Empire, predecessor of the Turkish Republic,
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violently suppressed the independence movement of its Armenian subjects by 
systematically exterminating a large portion of their population. The news of this 
event circulated in the U.S. media and caused President Wilson to promise an 
establishment of an Armenian homeland after the Great War. Turks, on the other 
hand, successfully fought a war against the victorious Allies and declared their 
independence. This realistically ended any possibility of establishing an Armenian 
country in Asia Minor. When the U.S. government signed the Lausanne Treaty, 
many Americans perceived the Treaty as abandoning previous U.S. international 
obligations towards Armenians.
The second issue that strengthened opposition to the Treaty was racial and 
religious prejudice against the Muslims and Turks. Some Americans opposed the 
treaty simply because it put the U.S. on equal terms with a predominantly Muslim 
country. The perception of the Turks and Muslims extended the historical memory 
of the Christian-Muslim struggle from the Battle of Tours in 782 A.D. The 
opposition of many Americans to the Treaty did not allow the Senate to produce 
the two-thirds of the vote to ratify the Treaty and establish equal relations with 
Turkey in January 1927. The Armenian situation and the racial and religious 
prejudice created a common ground for the opponents of the Treaty to transmit 
opinion among many segments of American society. The Lausanne Treaty, 
however, ultimately survived because the Coolidge administration decided that it 
was in its best interest to implement the terms of the Treaty regardless of the vote 
in the Senate. It also understood that the opposition movement had lost its
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strength and momentum. There was no political will to fight the Treaty again, and 
therefore little possibility of a public backlash.
This thesis employed four distinguished historians’ theories to help explain the 
origins of the relations between the U.S. and the Turkish Republic between 1923 
and 1927. Although all four theories help to understand different aspects of the 
relationship, no one can provide a singular intellectual framework when we study 
the entire sequence of events during this four year period. Walter LaFeber’s “Open 
Door and Empire” theory describes the fagade of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. 
policy makers principally sought free opportunity for all powers in the Near East. 
When the opportunity presented itself, like the Chester Concession, however, it did 
not hesitate to engage in an imperial struggle with Britain. LaFeber’s theory, with 
its disregard for the public’s impact on U.S. foreign policy making, does not 
sufficiently explain why the Lausanne Treaty was rejected.
Matthew Connolly’s “small power politics” helped to explain the Turkish 
strategy during the Lausanne Conference. The new Turkish Republic’s policy 
makers appreciated that the wealth of the Near East had the potential to divide the 
U.S. from the European Allies. That was why the Turks supported the U.S. Open 
Door policy and granted the Chester Concessions to the Americans. This enabled 
the Turks to have the U.S. on their side during the Lausanne Conference.
Although the Turks could not regain Mosul, the U.S. support strengthened their 
bargaining power in other areas. It was perhaps due to U.S. support that the Turks 
were able to completely reverse the Sevres Treaty, which had put an end to the 
Ottoman Empire. Connelly rightly claimed that small powers take advantage of the
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big power politics and are able to exert some influence on larger powers’ policy 
making process. This theory also has its limits. Much as the Turks tried, they could 
not cause the U.S. to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. Although the Turks gained the 
support of the U.S. government at the Conference, the public turned against the 
Treaty. Since the Turks did not have any incentives to offer the American people, 
they could not ensure its ratification. The Turkish case suggests that Connelly’s 
theory is not sufficient to explain the chain of events after the signing of the Treaty.
Michael Hunt’s “ideology” theory fills the gap which LaFeber and Connelly left 
in their disregard for cultural norms, historical memory, and prejudices and their 
impact on foreign policy making. Hunt’s description of ideology as a common 
language that transmits peoples’ ideas to policy makers is vital to understanding 
why and how the Lausanne Treaty was rejected. Between the signing of the 
Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and the Senate’s rejection of it in 1927, the public debate 
provided the Democratic Party policy makers with an ideological framework and 
thus legitimized their opposition in the Senate. Hunt’s theory, however, does not 
offer any insight or explanation when examining the Lausanne Conference 
negotiations, the Turks’ attitude, and the U.S. Open Door policy. Furthermore, the 
“ideology” theory is not equipped to explain President Coolidge’s reactivation of the 
Treaty right after the Senate vetoed it.
Kristin Hoganson introduced the impact of gender relations and boisterous 
character on U.S. foreign policy making. The impact of the news of the Armenian 
Genocide and the propaganda around the myth of Turks keeping “white Christian 
girls” in their harems affected a large segment of the public to support acting manly
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and save unprotected Christian girls. Although Hoganson’s theory helps us to 
understand the path to reject the treaty, like Hunt’s, it is limited and does not 
concern itself with the Open Door policy and the Turks’ ability to influence events 
and their outcome.
If just one theory could explain the origins of the Turkish-American relations 
between 1923 and 1927, there would not have been a need to examine this 
historical period. Theories provide a framework to conduct research and analyze 
the results. The possibility of coming up with a simple explanation for the origins of 
U.S. policy towards Turkey and the hope of creating a new single theory became a 
naive dream. The theories of LaFeber, Connelly, Hunt, and Hoganson were 
important to deconstructing individual incidences and issues. When these theories 
were applied to a sequence of events, however, none of them were sufficient to 
understanding this time frame in its entirety.
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